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Note from the editor
Dear reader, 
Ten years ago the first editor of this newsletter Richard 
Swedberg demanded for an economic sociology of law 
(Swedberg 2002 in Economic Sociology – Electronic Euro-
pean Newsletter 3(3), 47-52). It is evident that law is a 
fundamental institution for any economy. After classical 
sociology had included the analysis of law as a task for a 
general sociology, sociology of law and economic sociolo-
gy separated. Afterwards, modern economic sociology 
almost completely neglected to include law in its studies of 
economies. 
The current issue – Conventions, Law and Economy – is 
devoted to the analysis of the interrelation of law and 
economy (also economics). This is done from the perspec-
tive of the main strand of new French economic sociology: 
the so-called "économie des conventions" (economics of 
convention, in short EC). From its beginning in the 1980ies 
its research objects such as economic organizations and 
markets, labor relations (contracts, unemployment, qualifi-
cation, salaries), quality conventions (logics of coordination 
and production), official statistics were also related to law 
as institution. EC nowadays integrates the analysis of eco-
nomic situations as well as the analysis of political econo-
my (on national and international level). It has developed in 
the Parisian region over almost three decades and one can 
speak of a second generation of this scientific movement. 
The claim is: EC has contributed to such an economic soci-
ology of law as Swedberg demanded for – as the contribu-
tions in this issue will demonstrate. Thereby, EC included 
the analysis of law into its analysis of economic institutions. 
This was done on the ground of its pragmatic socio-
economic theory of (economic) coordination between 
competent (economic) actors. 
In the first contribution Laurent Thévenot sketches the 
ways EC approaches the analysis of law and he also pre-
sents more recent developments in the analysis of law. He 
works out the suitability of EC to analyze law, because EC 
focuses in general on how actors coordinate in a way they 
judge as proper and justifiable and on how actors “quali-
fy” states, products, actions or persons. Law mediated 
coordination and the interpretation of juridical rules there-
fore are part of the research field of EC. But in contrast to 
positivistic and internal studies of laws, EC examines the 
pragmatic reality of law in economic coordination and how 
competent actors evaluate and apply juridical rules. Thé-
venot relates the approach of the plurality of orders of 
justification to the regimes of engagement (“engagement 
in the familiar” and the “engagement in plan”) to show 
how rules are pragmatically adapted by actors in different 
everyday situations. Nevertheless, Thévenot applies EC also 
to the macro level. 
Claude Didry proposes to analyze the emergence of collec-
tive contracts (“conventions collectives”) from the point of 
view of coordinating actors. He traces the development of 
the collective labor law in France from the 19th century on. 
He interprets the emergence of collective contracts in the 
Paris region in the 1930ies as an answer to organizational 
problems of coordination in the course of production. 
Didry argues that the labor convention approach changes 
the perspective on industrial labor organization by includ-
ing the historical processes of the emergence of self-
reflexive and self-questioning collectives. For Didry eco-
nomic institutions – as labor law and collective contracts – 
are not pre-given external constraints to economic action 
but the result of historical processes wherein competent 
actors try to “make sense” of their economic coordination 
in a plurality of “worlds of production”. 
Christian Bessy applies the EC-approach in the analysis of 
the market for legal services. On the basis of qualitative 
interviews he identifies different combinations of lawyer-
client relations, of quality conventions and organizational 
forms of the law firm. Bessy sketches also newer trends 
such as the upcoming of the big international law firms 
and of network cooperation in this market. He critically 
assesses new tendencies of legal services because they 
promote an individualistic notion of law and its privatiza-
tion. 
Emmanuel Charrier and Jérôme Pélisse study the role of 
economists as experts in law courts. Charrier and Pelisse 
conceive these experts as intermediaries of law. Using 
survey data and qualitative interviews they study the con-
ventional basis of their practices as well as their participa-
tion in the elaboration and translation of conventions. 
In the interview with Olivier Favereau one of the founders 
of EC and his work is presented. The current issue includes 
some reviews which complement the focus on EC. Two of 
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them are directly related to the analysis of law in economic 
fields. The third book reviewed is a fundamental contribu-
tion to the socio-economic theory of (economic) value. 
Rainer Diaz-Bone*, 
rainer.diazbone@unilu.ch  
*In autumn 2012, Rainer Diaz-Bone is guest researcher at the 
research laboratory Institutions et dynamiques historiques de 
l’économie (IDHE) (at the Ecole normale supérieure de Ca-
chan/Paris). 
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Law, Economies and Economics: New Critical 
Perspectives on Normative and Evaluative Devices 
in Action
By Laurent Thévenot 
Groupe de Sociologie Politique et Morale (EHESS, Paris) 
and Laboratoire de Sociologie Quantitative (CREST, Paris), 
laurent.thevenot@ehess.fr  
The metamorphose of contemporary economies rests on a 
deep transformation of modes of coordination. The ra-
tionale behind this change is usually presented as the sub-
stitution. Horizontal democratic coordination of informed 
and responsible individuals would replace former authori-
tarian and paternalist politics. For their information, regula-
tive procedures or instruments play an unprecedented role 
in this new political economy. This paper is dedicated to 
recent research on the relations between law, economies 
and economics, benefiting from the French approach of 
the économie des conventions (economics of convention, 
in short EC) and its new developments. A first section re-
calls why EC is adjusted for the analysis of law in action, 
and made possible a long-standing cooperation with law 
scholars. A second section introduces new analytical devel-
opments that help to situate legal regulations among a 
variety of guarantees and engagements which take place 
in economic and social life. They contribute to the critical 
clarification of new normative and evaluative devices which 
are involved in contemporary policies, in EU in particular. 
1. The comparative advanatages of EC when 
analyzing law in action 
In French, convention is the proper legal term for any cov-
enant and, in English, it designates agreements between 
countries. Although EC offers a wider understanding of 
the notion than the legal one, it also deals with frames of 
agreement that help to coordinate behaviors in uncertain 
conditions and the perspective of failure or dispute. Hence, 
EC is able to situate law regulations among a wide variety 
of coordination modes used in economic and social life. 
Each of the specialized disciplines of economics and sociol-
ogy has developed its own models of coordination. When 
meeting the empire of law, each of them often attempts 
to reduce law to its models. It tries to unveil the genuine 
coordination supposed to be hidden by law formalities. EC 
departs from these attempts by a more law-friendly ap-
proach. This paper benefits from a series of collaborative 
research programs with law scholars which testify to this 
friendliness.1 Partnership arose with law scholars who 
were interested in the dynamics of legal judgment and its 
justificatory bases. They departed from a dogmatic and 
strict law positivism which emphasizes the letter of the law 
and downplays the process of implementation in a particu-
lar situation. By contrast to those who pretend that law 
does not contain values, these scholars open law episte-
mology to cognitive foundations including value judgments 
(Perulli 2010). 
EC analysis of coordination takes also in consideration 
actors' cognitive and evaluative competences (Diaz-Bone 
2011), allowing a parallel between justification in everyday 
situations and in law (Thévenot 2006, chap.6). The Econ-
omies of worth framework, which strongly contributed to 
EC and to cooperation with law scholars, accounts for the 
plurality of legitimate justifications which refer to the 
common good ("orders of worth"), and for the dynamics 
of compromise required to locally appease the strenuous 
relationships between several of them (Boltanski and Thé-
venot 2006). Labor law implementation involves a wide 
range of justifications which the judge has to "balance". 
This plurality follows that of economical organizations built 
on compromising arrangements between conventional 
modes of coordination which differ from one "model of 
production" to the other (Eymard-Duvernay 2004). The 
industrial order of worth is prominent whenever the inter-
est of the productive organization – not of the sharehold-
ers – and its technical efficiency are at stake. The civic 
order of worth that endorses collective egalitarian solidarity 
is involved, together with industrial productive efficiency, 
when justifying collective agreements (conventions collec-
tives), social protection or collective restructuring programs 
(plan social). Giving priority to seniority in lay-off proce-
dures, or taking into account salaried employees' attach-
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ment to the firm involve still another order of worth, do-
mestic. 
In legal judgment, the "rule or proportionality" federates a 
range of justifications in search for compromises, as in the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Discrimination 
cases demonstrate that the British state looks for such 
compromises between the right to freedom of speech and 
expression and Muslims sacred religious sentiments. Both a 
practitioner and a legal theorist, Leader developed a 
framework which accounts for a plurality of justifications 
which law judgments refer to (Leader 2000, 2005). Two of 
them converge with orders of worth: the "civic" one is 
based on fundamental egalitarian rights and largely over-
laps the civic order of worth; the "functional" one is close 
to the industrial worth and places value on the efficient 
functioning of the productive organization. 
Yet pluralism among legal justifications may be less reflec-
tively integrated. Looking at multinational companies in-
vesting in the global economy, Leader observes a kind of 
de facto pluralism which merely results from separate spe-
cialized bodies of law which regulate commercial compa-
nies, investment and trade (Leader 2010). It poses a threat 
to basic labour rights. In contrast to this non reflected 
upon tacit pluralism, Leader pleads a "civic pluralism". Like 
other internationally recognized fundamental rights, labour 
rights would have the same weight as part of an emerging 
constitution of civil society. The category of fundamental 
rights helps to host a plurality of justifications within a 
legal framework, although individual rights do not fully 
capture the virtuous interdependencies that lead to a 
common good and related order of worth. They can con-
tribute to include in the constitution, as in the Spanish one 
enacted in 1978, the egalitarian solidarity of civic worth in 
the domains of health, education and security (Lyon-Caen 
and Champeil-Desplat 2001). 
Observing jurisprudence, law scholars noticed that the 
weight of the market order of worth is rising at the ex-
pense of the domestic and civic orders of worth. The Euro-
pean Court thus questioned labour law protections of 
employees on the motive that they impeded market com-
petition and the benefits of moving the production from 
one European country to another (Perulli 2010). Even the 
industrial worth that places value on the core productive 
organization of the firm is presently loosing ground against 
market worth (Sachs 2012). In the large domain of public 
services and utilities, this change of weight between mar-
ket and civic orders of worth is clearly visible in EU regula-
tions and jurisprudence, questioning the possibility to con-
tain the overwhelming increase of the market worth (Thé-
venot 2001). In the British case, most public services agents 
have to submit their activities to "market testing" and only 
a very limited core of public services remains, not for its 
own worth but as an exception to marketization: judicial 
and legislative powers, and activities that infringe funda-
mental individual freedoms (Lyon-Caen and Champeil-
Desplat 2001). This marketization also aims at eradicate 
helpful relationships that used to complement the anony-
mous collective solidarity of civic worth and be aggran-
dized in the domestic order of worth, making the differ-
ence between "doing someone a service" as a good turn 
and "offering a service to a customer". More generally, 
domestic worth has a significant place as a source of law 
when it refers to customs and traditions, and also in legal 
judgments that place value on seniority (Thévenot 2006, 
chapter 6). 
A last reason why EC is well fitted for the analysis of law 
comes from the notion of qualification which it borrowed 
from legal judgment. The judge has to qualify the factual 
situation, i.e. to select and format the relevant (from rele-
vare: raise up) evidence to state that a certain regulation 
applies. Similarly, human and non human entities have to 
qualify for a conventional order of worth for their being 
involved in this convention of coordination which is thus a 
convention of quality. This is the way EC’s realistic ap-
proach to coordination is based on the shaping of the 
material environment, and not limited to values or argued 
discourse. Even before EC, the framework on "investments 
in forms" put forward the trans-format-ting of the world 
which is needed for a formal rule to be implemented and 
for coordination to operate (Thévenot 1984). 
2. Law in reality, among a variety of guarantees and 
engagements in everyday life 
Sen's notion of capability (1985) contributed to a remarka-
ble progress in the evaluation of rights implementation. It 
helps to contemplate the distance to be filled between the 
availability of an individual right and the possibility of its 
being enforced in a particular situation. Yet, it develops 
within a vocabulary of functioning, objective, choice, free-
dom, still too close to law to account for the whole chain 
of transformations of the person and his/her environment 
that are needed for law enforcement in reality. To deal 
with them, we posit the guarantee that legal conventions 
offer holders of rights and obligations within a range of 
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possible guarantees which rely on extra-legal capacities in 
everyday life. Instead of linking directly such guarantees to 
mutual trust, or to converging mutual expectancies that 
conventions assume, we look for a source of guarantee in 
the person's commitment with oneself which brings assur-
ance and on the ground of a convenient environment. We 
chose the terms “engage” and “engagement” to designate 
such convenience (Thévenot 2006, 2007). These terms are 
still congruent with the legal vocabulary used to characterize 
the individual involvement. However, law focuses on the 
person's disposition while the category of engagement also 
underlines the need to prepare the ground, to get the sur-
rounding conveniently prepared for a certain engagement or 
commitment to operate. With this analytical frameworks, we 
can identify which engagement law, economics or sociolo-
gy respectively assume as principal, and their added speci-
fications or limitations (Thévenot 2008). Light is shed on 
the contrasted and reductive evaluation which each offer 
of law in effect, bringing support to the alternative and 
more comprehensive category of "law realization" (réalisa-
tion du droit) which legal scholars developed (Lyon-Caen 
and Affichard 2008). 
Below formal guarantees: engaging in personal fa-
miliar convenience 
The regime of engagement with the world and with one-
self which originates personal convenience in familiarity is 
particularly distant from legal conventions. Therefore, fo-
cusing on practical aspects of this familiar engagement 
usually leads to a critical evaluation of the formalities of 
law. Economics offers limited insights into this way of 
engaging with the situation: Richard Nelson's and Sidney 
Winter's evolutionary theory of economic change rests on 
the category of routine; Oliver Williamson's transaction 
cost economics is based on investments in specific assets. 
By contrast, economic sociology has paid close attention to 
"informal practices" that generate trust while differing 
from the formality of market prices and legal contracts, 
notably in contemporary Russia where they combine (Bar-
sukova and Radaev 2012). Sociology is more accustomed 
than economics to elaborate on this familiar engagement. 
Yet, theories of practice which refer to habits, habitus and 
bodily experiences usually conceive them as collective and 
shared – "social" in this limited meaning. They miss two 
related features which are highly significant to understand 
the source of familiar trust or guarantee: the idiosyncrasy 
of the practical habituation; the needed prolongation of 
the habituated body in personally accommodated sur-
roundings. One finds one's bearings, as commonly said, in 
one's familiarized surroundings by placing peculiar markers 
and arranging things for oneself in order to make them 
fitting and to get a proper hold on them. Engaging with a 
familiarized environment creates a confident convenience 
on which a mode of coordination with others can be built 
that is neither collective nor social in the usual sense, but 
highly personalized and only gradually expanded from one 
close link to another. Network representation does not 
fully capture the incomplete transitivity from one link to 
another, neither the role played by intermediaries in the 
transition and mutuality of familiar convenience. Eymard-
Duvernay showed that such intermediaries transform re-
cruitment evaluating procedures to make them more recep-
tive of personal accommodation with work environment, 
and less discriminatory (Eymard-Duvernay 2012). Olivier De 
Schutter (2006) observed that anti-discriminatory law ex-
tends in this direction to take into account disabilities. A 
European directive (2000/78, November 27, 2000) imposes 
"reasonable accommodation" as a modification to a work 
environment that enables a person with a disability to 
perform the job. It meets the above-mentioned characteri-
zation of familiar engagement and acknowledges that 
guarantee depends on the person engaging with a con-
venient environment, as a visibly rough floor when fear of 
falling is threatening (Lyon-Caen and Affichard 2008).2 
Sophisticated combinations of the formality and public 
detachment of law with informal and personally accom-
modated practices and environments raise new challenges 
for research. 
More about law and policies core categories of will, 
autonomy, project, contract: engaging in an individ-
ual plan with a functionally convenient environment 
The vocabulary of individualization is widely used when 
legal conventions, institutions, organizations and policies 
are getting closer to persons. It brings confusion between 
two characterizations of individual or personal agency. 
What we have seen of the personal confidence which is 
gained by engaging in familiarity with accommodated 
surroundings, contrasts with the self-assurance which is 
associated with the idea of autonomy and supported by a 
different regime of engaging in a individual plan, or pro-
ject. A collective research program on welfare and educa-
tional policies getting closer, ran by Marc Breviglieri and 
the author, used this differentiation of engagements to 
observe and analyze how accompaniment support has to 
take care of familiarity as a preliminary step in the trans-
formations aiming at an autonomous self-projected indi-
vidual (Breviglieri, Stavo-Debauge, and Pattaroni 2003; 
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Breviglieri 2009; Thévenot 2012). Less intimate and less 
dependent on a past idiosyncratic path, engaging in an 
individual plan is future oriented. Assumed by what is 
called will, the self-assurance of being able to project one-
self in time to come depends on engaging with functional-
ly formatted surroundings. By comparison to the former 
regime of familiarity, this one involves more objectivity. The 
relevant environment is made up of common functional 
objects instead of personal grips on subjectively identified 
pieces of affordance. Although individually undertaken, 
plans and functions are sufficiently impersonal to be re-
ferred to by common names – which is not the case of 
routines – and to foster joint plans coordination. In ethno-
graphic observation, we observed that skilled social, educa-
tional or health workers manipulate the format of the 
setting into a functionally structured environment to in-
duce a change from pure familiar confidence to planning 
autonomous self-assurance. 
Leader named "consensual" the justification met in judicial 
judgments that do not refer to any specification of the 
common good but only rest on the mutuality of several 
individuals being engaged in a joint plan (Leader 2000).3 
More generally, liberal law takes for granted the engage-
ment in a plan which gives consistency to the individual 
will, without consideration for the formatting of the envi-
ronment that facilitates this engagement. Willfulness is 
looked for in investigations, and judicial acts are under-
stood as expressions of the will which produce legal ef-
fects. New European welfare policies are oriented – almost 
exclusively – towards this engagement when they promote 
activation, individual autonomy and responsibility, projects 
and contractual agreements, enlightened consent. Surro-
gates of US welfare programs are also dominated by this 
engagement, as demonstrated by fine-grained ethno-
graphic analysis (Eliasoph 2011). The differentiation of 
regimes expands on critical theory, exposing the coloniza-
tion of other engagements by a dominant one, and the 
resulting pressure or oppression which one regime of en-
gagement exerts upon another and which critique of pow-
er relations and domination does not usually account for. 
Law and economics reducing planned action to an 
objective output: the two stances when engaging in 
conventions and conveniences 
Neoclassical economics assumes that no other engagement 
that the plan governs human action. On the other hand, 
far from fully acknowledging this regime, it restrictedly 
specifies the notions of will, project or consent within the 
market coordination framework. All plans or options to be 
individually chosen are presumably marketed. Apart from 
the unrealistic cognitive burden of optimization which 
weighs down the individual for the choice of an optional 
transaction plan, this economics relies on the formatting of 
the reality into market options. This hypothesis remains 
usually implicit. It appears only at fault, when information 
about the quality of market goods is found asymmetric. 
This hypothesis is de facto buttressed by the huge present-
day apparatus designed to guarantee quality conventions, 
through standardization and certification (Busch 2011). A 
similarity between this conventional objectivity and the 
legal one helps to bridge the gap between the two disci-
plines in the Law and economics literature. Both also re-
duce the movement of action, with its tentative attempts 
in time and space, to a punctual decision confused with an 
immediate output, like in spot markets. As a result of these 
two short-circuits, the projected plan – or will – merges 
with the objective output, without any concern for the 
inquietude of the plan in action and its unsure endeavors. 
On the contrary, the concept of engagement offers a sys-
tematic view of the dynamical regime comprising two 
contrasted stances: "closed" or "open" eyes (Thévenot 
2006, 2009). Research on coded forms before Economies 
of worth pointed to "the paradox of coding": users of 
coded forms complain about the excessive reduction 
brought by formality (Thévenot 2011b). All institutions give 
rise to such a paradox, and the notion of engagement 
shows that the same tension is inherent to any commit-
ment. On the one hand, once invested in, a convenient 
form is bolstered by a blind confidence that favors coordi-
nation. The quietude of conforming to it demands that we 
close our eyes to other forms of possible coordination that 
are thus sacrificed. The moment our eyes are opened, in 
the course of the tentative efforts to carry the engagement 
through adversities, the second stance of the regime ap-
pears, accompanied by doubt, suspicion and inquietude. 
A hermeneutical understanding of this contrast highlights 
the tension between the letter of the convention and the 
opening of its interpretation.4 It illuminates the open pro-
cess of the legal judgment which economists disregard 
when they reduce law in action to the letter of the law. The 
resulting evaluation of law efficiency views the regulation as 
a simple functional mechanism which puts constraints on 
market coordination (Affichard/Lyon-Caen/Vernac 2010). 
With its time perspective, the notion of engagement opens a 
more pragmatist than hermeneutical avenue of research, in 
the sense it makes room to the unforeseeable adjustment to 
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the environment and not only to interpretation. But Ameri-
can pragmatism did not positively consider the closed eyes 
stance of the convention or engagement, when one sticks 
to its letter (Thévenot 2011a). And encompassing both 
stances is needed to properly criticize the evaluative turn 
that nowadays interlinks law, politics and economics. 
Law, politics and economics in the evaluative turn: a 
critical appraisal of governing by objective objectives 
The globalized evaluative turn hinders criticism since it is 
supposed to offer citizens a more realist account of the 
effect of laws and policies, providing them with an evi-
dence-based information. For the format of this evaluation, 
engagements are fragmented into small plans that in turn 
are reduced to their objectives. The objectives are in turn 
confused with the objective quantification of their fulfill-
ment, which is mistaken for the final aim. Preempted by a 
ready-made evaluation that is included in the package of 
the policy, any challenge is forced to borrow this imposed 
format to present evidence and, in the end, the policy and 
the good in question. 
Focusing on an objective objective is also intended to be 
politically open to diversity which gives rise to a variety of 
ways to reach it. The present day European harmonization 
of policies and law involves considerable effort to cope 
with the diversity of domestic legal systems and institu-
tions. Retreating from the ambition of unification, Europe-
an integration has been constantly based on the notion of 
"coordination" which brings us back to our research pro-
gram. In 1951, the very first step of the European Coal and 
Steel Community implied to "coordinate" investments and 
trade. Half a century later, the Open Method of Coordina-
tion (OMC) is imposed on all European Union as a general 
policy evaluation procedure based on objective and stand-
ard statistical indicators that would foster, through compara-
tive results, convergence. Standards and statistics build con-
ventional equivalence between elementary plans which, 
submitted to the general evaluation of their technical effi-
ciency, qualify for the order of industrial worth – not the 
market one. To be a tool of government for such an indus-
trial polity, standards and statistics need to be unified and 
centralized, as for skill and training qualifications in 1970-
80 France (Thévenot 2011c). As noted by Affichard and 
Lyon-Caen (2005) in their critical appraisal of OMC and the 
"Lisbon strategy for jobs", standards and statistics cannot 
be tools to govern an industrial EU. For lack of centraliza-
tion and standardization of statistics, the "adjustment of 
statistical indicators to the local rules of each domestic 
labor market" is missing. Statistical indicators – as the 
employment rate – would rather govern a market EU with 
the emphasis placed on labour flexibility (Salais 2004). 
As for policies, the European harmonization of law retreat-
ed from the ambition of unified principles for the common 
good to the format of plan engagement supporting "direc-
tives", with a focus on its objective, and possibly the objec-
tive measurement of this target (Porta 2008). In the case of 
law, the reality which is grasped by the objective objective 
is not the domestic economy, but the domestic legal sys-
tem to which EU law has to be transposed. 
* 
The globalized evaluative turn takes only into account a 
reduced form of engagement in a plan, of which it confus-
es the dynamics with a measurable objective. This evalua-
tion is unaware of the place of justifiable engagements in 
the common good, such as civic solidarity in the public 
services, or industrial efficiency in the firm. Neither can it 
take in consideration the familiar engagement which is 
primordial to the person's consistency. Involved in the 
implementation of welfare, health and education policies, 
it is also assumed by the last developments of anti-
discriminatory law. Putting all the emphasis on the objective 
ignores the "eyes open" stance of the engagement regime 
that characterizes the actor's concern with questioning and 
searching. It remains masked by the encoded indicator that 
is given for objective. More than the performativity of the 
coded form, economic sociology has to critically bring to 
light the complex series of reductions which oppress con-
veniences and conventions, through new normative and 
evaluative devices promoted for their unprecedented real-
ism. 
Laurent Thévenot is Professor of Sociology at Ecole des 
Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris and a founding 
member of Groupe de Sociologie Politique et Morale. He is 
also senior researcher at the Center for Research in Eco-
nomics and Statistics, Paris, and co-founder of the Conven-
tion Theory trend. He is the author of On Justification: 
Economies of worth, (2006 [1991] with Luc Boltanski), 
Rethinking Comparative Cultural Sociology: Repertoires of 
Evaluation in France and the United States (2000, with 
Michèle Lamont), L'action au pluriel: sociologie des ré-
gimes d'engagement (2006). 
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Endnotes 
1Since its creation in 1992, the small structure of the International 
Institute for Comparative Studies (Institut International pour les 
Etudes Comparatives: IIPEC), chaired by the law scholar Antoine 
Lyon-Caen and directed by Joëlle Affichard, has played an im-
portant role in fostering collaborative research programs between 
law, institutional economics and sociology. An international Euro-
pean network of law scholars was involved together with young 
PhD law students, senior members of the EC movement (François 
Eymard-Duvernay, Olivier Favereau, Robert Salais, Laurent Thé-
venot) and junior economists and sociologists as well. On the 
topics that this paper addresses, see: Lyon-Caen and Affichard 
2008; Lyon-Caen and Champeil-Desplat (eds.) 1998, 2001. 
2For the preparation of persons and their surroundings in the 
chain of "law realization" which action against ethnic discrimina-
tion requires, see Stavo-Debauge (2005, 2008). By contrast, the 
ministerial technical norms that regulate the implementation of 
authorized exceptions to the penal code articles penalizing abor-
tion, in Brazil, rely on exacting requirements and trying prelimi-
nary interviews which “make non-criminal abortion services an 
inhospitable environment for the more familiar attachments and 
intimate experiences” brought in by an experience as personal as 
that of abortion (De Castelbajac 2009). 
3Yet Pascal Lokiec (2004) documented the current hybridization 
of contractual agreements that do also incorporate justifications 
for the common good.  
4Boltanski followed this path in his analysis of the "hermeneutic 
contradiction" associated to institutions (Boltanski 2009). 
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Contribution of the “Labour Conventions 
Approach” to a Different History of Socio-
economic Institutions
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Translation by Nat London 
The “labour conventions approach” developed by Robert 
Salais (Salais 1989, 1994a; Storper/Salais 1997) explores a 
way of writing the history of socio-economic institutions 
that starts with what is, for Marx, the most obvious mani-
festation of capitalism, “an immense collection of com-
modities.”1 At the heart of the method is the realization of 
the product, that is to say not only its production but also 
the reality test which for him is the “satisfaction of human 
needs” (Marx 1976). If capitalist society presents itself as 
“an immense collection of products,” it is in the sense of 
an enormous collection of “worlds of production,” that is 
to say, of social collectivities. The identification of “labour 
conventions” aims at unravelling the tangle of repeated 
interactions that occur in these “worlds of production.” It 
is as if a collection of social groups appeared on the mar-
ketplace, reflecting the existence of a complex division of 
labour across society as a whole. 
But starting with the existence of “worlds of production” 
identified through their “products,” the “labour conven-
tions approach” raises questions about the organizational 
forms taken by productive activities and the institutional 
foundations on which they are based. For example, in the 
context of an “industrial district,” it is not uncommon for 
productive activity to develop from small units in which 
work and family life merge. How can one explain, there-
fore, the crystallization of what is today the dominant 
form, that is the company and its correlate, the employee? 
Is the institutional dimension of this process linked to the 
constitution of an hierarchical space escaping from the 
functioning of the labour market (Williamson 1985), or to 
the existence of a legal framework defining the “rules of 
the game” through which the interacting links between 
individuals are made and unmade (North 1991)? 
This question does not really arise in classical social history 
since the division between employees and business leaders 
is taken as a given, inherent to capitalism. This primary 
partition is the starting point of a centralization of hierar-
chical power held by employers in accordance with a dy-
namic of concentration of capital based on efficiency 
which is both technical (reduction of production costs from 
the perspective of Marx) and informational (reduction of 
transaction costs from the perspective of Williamson). 
Labour law appears as a response to the “social question” 
posed by the division between employees and employers 
(Castel 1994) and as an element in the resolution of the 
“organizational problem” posed by the emergence of 
large firms (Williamson 1985). It is seen as an “institution” 
in the sense that it helps limit abuses, uncertainties and 
inefficiencies in the labour market. 
The “labour conventions approach” leads to a different 
historical perspective, starting with freedom of trade estab-
lished by the rule of law. It raises questions about the institu-
tions which define the relationships between people who 
contribute to the realization of these products by refusing to 
take the employee and the company as given entities. From 
this point of view, L’invention du chômage, [“The Invention 
of Unemployment”] (Salais/Baverez/Reynaud 1986), repre-
sents a major advance in analysing the institutional frame-
work from which the actors themselves apprehend the rela-
tionships they have forged in the realization of a product. 
This book demonstrated the historicity in France of a cate-
gory such as unemployment and correlatively that of the 
employment contract. Following my meeting Robert Salais 
in 1990, it would lead me down the path of “historical 
sociology of labour law” abandoning the orientation of 
Bourdieu with its focus on building social groups through 
legal categories2, thus integrating a “sociological point of 
view” on law as a motive of action for the agents (Weber 
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1978), that is to say how the actors mobilize legal norms in 
their social activities. Indeed, labour law is itself a historical 
product, whose crystallization is not only linked to the 
protection of workers or to optimizing company organiza-
tion. It corresponds to a specific evolution of “institutions” 
as “the rules of the game” (North 1991) in the relations 
between producers, allowing players to see themselves as 
“employees” or as “employers.” It therefore does not 
contribute to defining the best organization or “govern-
ance” of work but rather to the actors themselves ques-
tioning the company organization outlined by the collec-
tive group of employees. 
After returning to the “labour conventions approach”, I 
will start from the French case to consider the crystalliza-
tion of the employment contract starting with the legacy 
of the Civil Code and then to the current consequences of 
existing labour law in the workplace. 
1. From worlds of production to labour 
conventions 
1.1. The product as a starting point  
In Salais’ view, the product represents a collective activity 
of transformation of a world both natural and social. It 
testifies to the existence of deliberate individual activities 
guided by a common purpose and which, through their 
coordination, leads to a product that will be subjected to 
the “reality test,” that is to say, the fact of finding it a 
buyer. 
The product is the starting point of an investigation which 
goes back through time to unravel the web of social inter-
actions and individual activities which lie at its origins. But 
in the early stages of this investigation, very little is known 
about those who participated in its production. Who 
should be included in this “world of production”? Are they 
artisans, employees? Can we even say that they have 
“worked” to realize this product, when productive and 
family activities are so mixed together? We simply feel that 
these individuals have contributed to its production, and 
this has resulted in their remuneration. One imagines that 
if the product is sold, or at least allows the one who has 
advanced the funds to get back his investment with a 
surplus, the cycle will start again at a more or less sus-
tained rhythm. 
1.2. Productivity conventions 
In this probable but still uncertain cycle leading to the 
realization of a product, we discover a set of individuals 
who have laboured to mine coal, to melt the metal parts 
and assemble them, spinning silk, cotton … weaving, mak-
ing clothes etc. Events unfurl more or less as planned, 
according to the instructions given, the competence of 
colleagues or the quality of raw materials. But it is still 
necessary to deal with these accompanying uncertainties, 
to adjust the coordination with others in order to arrive at 
a satisfactory product which may find a buyer. Here, I 
think, we are touching on what Salais (1989) calls the 
“conventions of productivity,” according to which individ-
uals more or less know how to adjust to each other in 
dealing with various technical and social uncertainties, 
what to do depending on the equipment, the reactions of 
colleagues and what has been learned from past experi-
ences. The notion of “convention” means that these ad-
justments to uncertainties are not limited to the instruc-
tions of a boss or a superior but suppose a form of initia-
tive on the part of the actors – an initiative in their own 
activity participating in the division of labour and allocation 
of tasks among group members. 
1.3. The conventions of unemployment 
A second source of uncertainty in the realization of the 
product lies in its ability to find a buyer. Manufactured 
goods may remain for some time without finding a buyer 
and may not ever find one, or, inversely, they may arouse 
widespread enthusiasm. These fluctuations are the subject 
of a learning experience enabling producers to anticipate 
the rhythm of manufacturing, preparing for either over- or 
under-production. Thus, in an industry such as the gar-
ment trade, it is known that the approach of winter leads 
to increased sales and generates increased activity in gar-
ment shops and among home seamstresses. In the auto-
motive industry of the Belle Époque, seasonality was re-
versed, with fine weather being conducive to an increase 
in car sales (Fridenson 1972). Thus, worlds of production 
are characterized by specific social rhythms anticipated by 
the actors and leading in the early twentieth century to 
seeing unemployment on a professional basis. This touches 
on a business management question which is just as sensi-
tive for merchants and industrialists as it is, more broadly 
speaking, for all producers. This uncertainty about the 
product “finding a buyer” is partially reduced by a form of 
collective experience concerning expected quality and 
volume. It involves a division between the intention of 
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developing, or at least of maintaining, a group of firms and 
workers with the capabilities necessary for the manufac-
ture of products, and that of retraining the workers and 
restructuring the firms. The forms taken by this division are 
the “conventions of unemployment,” the concept of “un-
employment” here being a broad one, going beyond the 
historical category considered in L’invention du chômage 
(Salais/Baverez/Reynaud 1986). 
2. Challenges posed by the “invention 
of unemployment”: the historicity of 
the employment contract 
The “labour conventions approach” lays the foundation 
for a rethinking of economic dynamics having the merit of 
leaving open the institutional conditions of the individuals 
who take part. It therefore leads to questioning the place 
of these institutional dimensions, which characterizes in my 
view its strong singularity in relation to an approach to 
capitalism starting from the division between work-
ers/employees and employers/capitalists. An identification 
of “productivity conventions” is an aid in understanding 
productive activities as a form of coordination which there-
fore does not rely on the authority of a central individual, 
the employer or the capitalist, but rather on the adjust-
ments made by a plurality of actors. “Conventions of un-
employment” reflect a “denaturalization” of unemploy-
ment as the immediate expression of economic fluctua-
tions inherent in a market society. I would like to empha-
size this point, returning to the scope of the L’invention du 
chômage in this denaturalization of unemployment. 
2.1. Invention of unemployment or the birth of the 
unemployed? 
To speak about the invention of unemployment has little 
meaning in a classical view of industrialization seen as a 
succession of “industrial revolutions” related to technical 
developments and organizational innovations. The product 
here plays only a secondary role in relation to the social 
relationship regarded as thus consubstantial to capitalism: 
wage labour. From this starting point, production relates 
immediately to “work”, that is to say, the activity of 
“workers” who are under the orders of an “employer” 
who in return for their “work” pays them “wages”. When 
sales stagnate or fall, the “employer” no longer makes a 
profit and reduces production thus laying-off redundant 
workers. The worker works or does not work. “Unem-
ployment” is not strictly speaking “invented,” it is “identi-
fied” as a specific cause of involuntary deprivation of work 
compared to other factors such as lack of professional 
skills, illness, disability or old age. On this basis, in the 
views of Topalov (1994), the Naissance du chômeur [“birth 
of the unemployed”] corresponds to the birth of a political 
and social “category” identifying a new social group and 
related to a policy of mitigating workers suffering through 
the implementation of specific relief funds and job place-
ment institutions. 
A history emerges from L’invention du chômage which 
differs from the problematic category of “without a posi-
tion” or “without employment” due to “other accidental 
lack of work” from the 1896 census (Salais/ Baverez/ Rey-
naud 1986: 33). While the statistician views unemploy-
ment as a lack of a position in a workplace, the answers 
provided by census figures show a complex set of women 
who were unemployed or in “unknown situations,” differ-
ing significantly from the figure of the “unemployed” man 
formerly hired in workplace. A surprising link is thus made 
between female unemployment and home work that dis-
organizes the “statistician’s model” and reflects the diffi-
culty of the actors themselves in understanding their situa-
tion starting from the category of “without a job”. Indeed, 
the occasional lack of work for a woman working at home 
did not necessarily mean unemployment, conceived of as 
the rupture of a relationship with an employer, leading 
women to abstain from declaring themselves as being 
“without position” or as “unemployed” since they did not 
see themselves as being in this situation. 
The existence of a “floating population” linked to the 
category of “unemployment” is related to another catego-
ry which in this same period was the subject of a good 
amount of legislative and legal thinking: that of an “em-
ployment contract.” While it is possible to conceive of an 
inter-individual legal relationship between a worker and a 
“head of an enterprise,” the situation became more com-
plicated concerning those described as “isolated,” that is 
to say, those who worked at home, frequently for inter-
mediaries or “middle-men”. One of the questions in the 
debate on the employment contract that took place at that 
time specifically addressed the regulations for workers 
working at home who sometimes were described as “in-
dependents.” The employment contract was one of those 
tools used to identify the existence of a legal relationship 
between a merchant contractor and a worker, with the 
responsibilities of the former towards the latter gradually 
accumulating in terms of payment of wages, insurance 
against work accidents or of health and safety conditions. 
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This helped limit the “isolated” category without eliminat-
ing the complex situations in which the division between 
employers and employees remained unclear, as in the case 
of precision lathe cutting in the Arve Valley (Salais/Storper 
1997). 
2.2. Before the employment contract: the regime of 
the job contract [louage d’ouvrage] 
With L’invention du chômage we can see the possibility of 
productive activity in which the coordination of producers 
does not necessarily require an employment contract. This 
raises questions concerning the institutional frameworks of 
this productive activity going back to how the available 
legal tools are mobilized by the actors in the realization of 
a product at the centre of a “world of production.” Often 
the Revolution is thought to have played a destructive role, 
establishing individual freedom by eliminating the collec-
tive regulations of the corporations and prohibiting collec-
tive forms of action which could bring them back. The 
Allarde decree and the Le Chapelier law of 1791 are taken 
as the founding acts of a regime, paving the way for a 
“liberal modernity” (Castel 1994) which is characterized by 
the abstention of the State and the reconstitution of the 
private guardianship of the employers over the workers. 
This analysis ignores how the players adopted the laws of 
the Revolution, codified in the Civil Code. As shown by 
Cottereau (2002), work relations were not reduced solely 
to the “service contract” [louage de services] in Article 
1780 of the Civil Code. The actors themselves linked this 
to the complex architecture of the “job contract” [louage 
d’ouvrage] which, in addition to the service contract, in-
cluded transport contracts and “quotes and markets” 
[devis et marchés], which together cover Articles 1780 to 
1799 of the Civil Code. This legal architecture reflected the 
workers’ demand to establish a “real job contract” in 
which workers undertake a job at a “fixed price” in line 
with rates commonly accepted in the professional world. 
The Lyon silk industry appears, in this respect, as an exem-
plary “world of production” in which the canuts [silk 
weavers] and shop masters were those who took the job 
orders, demanding a rate which fixed prices in advance. 
They presented themselves as “entrepreneurs,” hired by 
the négociants [merchant-contractors], using in turn the 
services of compagnons [journeymen workers] and those, 
less formalized, of members of their own families. This 
architecture of work relations reveals a sharp division be-
tween merchant-contractors and workers, the merchants 
being in charge of the various operations in the production 
of a piece of silk, from spinning to weaving and dyeing. 
Meanwhile, the workers world, in turn, was characterized 
by a significant heterogeneity with the corporatist division 
between “master” (shop master, worker sub-contractor 
[ouvrier façonnier]) and compagnon, in addition to the 
diffusion of the work in the countryside. This world was 
not devoid of collective regulations. Thus, in Lyon the de-
mand for a rate was regularly advanced by the shop mas-
ters, as evidenced by the insurrections of 1831 and 1834. 
This institutional architecture, while it has an affinity with 
the worlds of production close to the fabrique collective 
[collective workshop], can be found in more “industrial” 
universes such as in the mines or the steel industry. This 
was particularly the case in the mines of the Nord Pas de 
Calais region, but also in the mines of Saint-Bel (Grange 
1994). This was also true in the steel industry, where the 
owners occasionally hid behind the ability of certain work-
ers to recruit “helpers,” thus avoiding their liability in case 
of an infringement of the legislation on child labour or 
health and safety conditions. In a “labour conventions 
method,” a system of “job contracts” [louage d’ouvrage] 
emerges around the figure of the shop master or labour 
sub-contractor [marchandeur] which immediately puts the 
product at the centre of group discussions where the 
“configurations of meaning” take shape through which 
actors come to see their identities and their participation in 
a common world. Indeed, these discussions focused pri-
marily on the “rate” for jobs as the basis of an agreement 
between the parties in a job contract, between the contrac-
tor and contractee, which might in turn lead to signing a 
service contract between the contractee and the workers. 
The “corporatist grammar” based on the duality between 
compagnons [journeymen workers] and masters was never 
really erased. Beyond the particularism of corporations, it 
entered the general language of contract law established 
by the Civil Code. It forged links between workers on the 
basis of a common condition based on the fluctuating 
relationship compagnon-master (in the case of Lyon) and 
the remuneration of the compagnon according to a fixed 
proportion of the job rate signed by the master. This soli-
darity manifested itself in strikes that brought together all 
workers in opposition to the contractors, merchants and 
industrialists. It resulted in the rates and professional cus-
toms which develop in a given world of production with 
the weakness represented by the ambivalent attitude of 
sub-contractors considered as intermediaries. Gradually, 
the existence of these intermediaries was called into ques-
tion due to the downward pressure on working conditions 
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which may result from too much competition. They were 
sometimes considered “marchandeurs” [labour sub-
contractors], practicing “marchandage” [labour sub-
contracting], a practice made illegal by the decree of 
March 2, 1848. Work accidents, but also the bankruptcy of 
marchandeurs, raised the problem of labour contractors in 
relation to workers in “service contracts.” Child labour 
laws heightened this responsibility, placing the labour 
contractors within the scope of a juridical offense and 
generating the need for the formalization of the legal 
relationship between the workers as a whole and the la-
bour contractors. 
“Corporatist grammar” could also be found in British 
Common Law, but in a more accentuated form through 
the residual aspects of the Master and Servants Act main-
taining the “crime of desertion” with respect to the work-
er who wants to leave his master (Deakin/Wilkinson 2005). 
Moreover, the distinction between masters and merchant-
contractors was not as sharp as evidenced by the case of 
the London silk industry where many masters were also 
shop owners (Hupfel 2010). This resulted in sharper antag-
onism between masters and workers. This antagonism fed 
the demand for equality of individual rights, in contrast to 
the relatively egalitarian and collective dynamic observed in 
France. 
2.3. The birth of labour law as a reverse questioning 
of law and worlds of production 
The role of intermediaries in France was questioned 
throughout the nineteenth century, with milestones such 
as the prohibition of marchandage [labour sub-contracting] 
in March 1848, but also that of child labour starting from 
the 1841 Guizot Law, the first of a long series. Salais 
(2011) suggests that in France this critique of 
marchandage is the basis of a reflection on the specific 
character of the identified link between workers and job 
contractors (merchants-contractors, factory owners) com-
pared to a purely market link, that is to say similar to that 
of a sale between a consumer and a merchant. This criti-
cism led to a gradual abandonment of the reference to the 
“job contract,” [louage d’ouvrage] discarding the model of 
a “workers sub- enterprise” (sections 1787 to 1799 Civil 
Code) to focus on the “service contract” [louage de ser-
vices] (Article 1780), as a general model of the employ-
ment relationship. The service contract became the legal 
matrix of work relationships in the face of the legal need 
to identify the accountability relationship that developed 
between job contractors [donneurs d’ouvrage] and work-
ers within a broader institutional evolution in which the 
term of work itself was being clarified. With many situa-
tions in which production took place at home, providing 
additional resources to small farmers in the regions of large 
manufacturing towns (the silk industry in Lyon, ribbon 
production in St. Etienne, cloth in Rouen, and linen in 
Cholet, etc.), entire families became involved in produc-
tion. It then became necessary to refine the concept of 
work itself, as something distinct from the family activity by 
excluding children and, to a lesser extent, women (prohibi-
tion of night work of women by the law of 2nd of Novem-
ber 1892). 
The debates that took place in the Superior Labour Council 
[Conseil Supérieur du Travail] and the Legislative Studies 
Association [Société d’Etudes Législatives] (between 1904 
and 1906) tended to identify those elements based on the 
“service contract” which would form the substance of an 
“employment contract.” Thus, the “employment contract” 
was defined in relation to the situation of the artisan who 
offered his work to the “public.” However, unlike the 
commercial contract of the artisan, the employment con-
tract is characterized by an exclusive and therefore lasting 
link between one “employee” and one or more given 
“employers” (Didry 2002). From this developed a pro-
foundly transformed legal grammar of labour relationships: 
while the job contract (louage d’ouvrage) referred to a 
community relationship between a group of producers 
(under the direction of a marchandeur), the employment 
contract is characterized by an individual relationship be-
tween a worker and one or more employers. This language 
provides the basis for an analysis of the legal subordination 
of the worker, which certainly leaves open the possibility of 
an assertion of the employer's authority over the latter, but 
simultaneously recognizes the worker as someone with 
rights in relation to his employer, able to question the 
employer’s responsibilities. 
This new juridical status did not find any immediate conse-
cration in the law (even if it played an important role in the 
adoption of the Labour Code in 1910), but it played a key 
regulatory role in the transformation of work relationships 
in a situation marked by the growth of large factories. It 
cannot be reduced to a simple “reflection” of the technical 
evolution which gave rise to the formation of large produc-
tion units. It also helped to clarify the situation of workers 
at home, as in the case of home-based garment workers at 
the heart of the law of 1915 establishing a “minimum 
wage.” This was not only a law which protected against 
the damaging effects on wages of competition between 
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seamstresses. It also required the systematic registration of 
wage rates by the job contractors, that is, besides the ar-
my, the large department stores. It was supplemented by a 
second law in 1917 which established, for the same seam-
stresses, the “English week,” that is to say, consecutive 
rest days on Saturday and Sunday. These laws introduced a 
radical transformation in an industry initially dominated by 
piecework, establishing a quasi-wage link between seam-
stresses and department stores without eliminating the 
concept of “entrepreneur” which is a possible professional 
classification of the activity of seamstresses in the agree-
ments of 1936 (Machu 2011). 
3. From the employment contract to the 
company 
These institutional changes could put into question the 
essential point of the “labour conventions approach” i.e., 
which considers all the participants in a “world of produc-
tion” as actors. If workers are bound by an individual con-
tract with an employer, they are placed under the authority 
of the latter and their role as “actors” may be reduced. The 
employment contract represents a fundamental change in 
the “legal grammar” of work relations. However, it must be 
considered in relation to the irreducibly collective dimension 
of work. It tends to show the structural duality which this 
contract embodies, insofar as in this modern labour law 
“next to its contractual dimension, the labour relation ... is 
linked to industrial relations.” (Jeammaud 1990: 4, translat-
ed by the author). Thus, the juridical classification of an 
individual relationship between the worker and the em-
ployer opens an investigation into the coordination of 
these workers amongst themselves, as a permanent capac-
ity to cope with the uncertainties that arise in the produc-
tion process regardless of the employer’s instructions. This 
coordination which employees experience in their work is 
the basis, I believe, of the new demands for “workers’ 
control” [Contrôle ouvrier] (Dehove 1937) which came 
forward in the great strikes of the Popular Front and con-
tinued into the on-going debates on labour law in the 
frequent cases of restructuring leading to a reduction of 
company jobs. 
3.1. Collective agreements of the Popular Front 
The employment contract affects how productive actors see 
their relations, that is, their “configuration of meaning.” This 
explains the close association that I have noted in the legal 
debates of the years 1904–1906, between employment 
contract and collective agreement (Didry 2002). The “collec-
tive agreement” was defined as a contract regulating the 
conditions of individual employment contracts. The question 
of compensation, a central point at the time when it set the 
“rate” of “jobs,” was then integrated into the broader 
question of work organization itself, linked to the regulation 
of its duration, whose genesis was the Sunday rest day 
(1906) and the 8 hour day (1919). This work organization 
made the distinction between “skilled workers” [ouvriers 
professionnels] and “unskilled workers” [ouvriers specialisés] 
established during the War in the arms industry and which 
led to the question of workers' skills, making it possible to 
establish a series of minimum wages. 
Collective agreements negotiated in the aftermath of the 
great strikes of the Popular Front (May–July 1936) devel-
oped out of the “institutional apprenticeship” that had 
taken place on the basis of the legislative progress of the 
first decades of the century. The analyses done by Robert 
Salais and myself, in line with an historical “labour conven-
tions approach” led us to identify a “world of production” 
crucial to the dynamic of these strikes and the subsequent 
collective bargaining: the defence sector and more specifi-
cally that of aeronautics (Didry/Salais 1995). Since the early 
1930s, this sector had been marked by a very strong dy-
namic of development in a general context of crisis and 
unemployment. It had to face the contradictions brought 
forth by the renewal of the forms of work organization that 
had been practiced during the First World War in a universe 
dominated by the figure of the skilled worker whose work 
was fettered by full compliance to the foreman’s instructions 
and authority. The revival of aircraft production faced diffi-
culties in developing large scale production in a world domi-
nated by many small manufacturers. In this context, the 
worlds of the metallurgical industry in Paris and St. Etienne 
lend themselves to a group examination of the productive 
organization supported by the unions. 
The collective agreement in the Parisian metal industry in 
July 1936 was the first response to these organizational 
problems, with the establishment of a scale of skills based 
on the duality skilled/unskilled worker (ouvrier profession-
nel/ouvrier specialisé) and the subsequent negotiation of a 
convention for employees, technicians, foremen and engi-
neers. As shown by Salais and Storper (1997), the negotia-
tion of this “pilot” agreement of the Parisian metal work-
ing industry contributed to the crystallization of a world of 
production characteristic of what was considered the 
“splendour of the Paris region” based on the companies at 
the centre of the subsequent innovative dynamic of the 
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aeronautics industry and more generally of “State produc-
tion.” The law of 24 June 1936 and the “model” agreement 
of the Parisian metal working industry tended to set a form 
of work organization around the duo “skilled/unskilled 
worker,” from which an explanation of the specific features 
of different modes of production becomes possible. These 
legal references help reveal unique worlds of production, 
especially in less “industrial” cases such as that of the preci-
sion lathe cutters of the Arve Valley who are divided be-
tween workers in small workshops and home workers 
(Didry 1998a). 
3.2. The dynamics of corporate restructuring 
The “labour conventions approach” leads to a reflection 
on the genesis of both the work contract and of the com-
pany from which progressively emerges the figure of the 
“entrepreneur” gradually demanding control over the 
organization of work. This figure develops in the early 
years of the twentieth century in a context in which the 
company’s identification as an employer is accompanied by 
questions both as to its strategies in the organization of 
production as well as to its choice of products. This ques-
tioning is at the centre of many historical monographs 
produced by the research group Institutions, Emploi, et 
Politiques Économiques [“Institutions, Employment and 
Economic Policy”], directed by R. Salais during the 1990s 
(Salais 1994b). It can also be found in research undertaken 
by R. Salais on corporate restructuring in the 1980s leading 
to collective redundancies and assistance from the Fund for 
Industrial Modernization (Salais 1992). This set of surveys 
reveals another dimension of the “labour conventions 
approach”: the plurality of possible worlds of production 
which can be present within the same company. In other 
words, if the company and the employment contract are 
the main institutional frameworks of activity in a “world of 
production,” the same company may experience evolution 
of production describing a trajectory between the different 
possible worlds of production which are outlined by labour 
conventions (Salais 1994a). 
During these restructuring processes, labour law provides 
the basis for interrogating the nature of conventions oper-
ating at work, not only through a reconsideration of the 
company's strategy identifiable in its financial data, but 
also through the mobilization of workers. The works coun-
cil [comité d’entreprise] becomes a place for debate lead-
ing actors to question the expected evolution and there-
fore existing labour conventions, prior to considering the 
conditions for the possibility of new forms of production 
that emerge from it. Here again, the “labour conventions 
approach” means freeing ourselves from the conception of 
the company as a management unit under the authority of 
a “boss”, to consider it as a work collective whose mem-
bers come to question their activities. The lawsuits involv-
ing works councils in situations of mass redundancies ena-
bled me during the 1990s to identify a plurality of registers 
of criticism of corporate management in the debates and 
forms of worker mobilization, revealing the texture of the 
labour conventions that are forged in the productive activi-
ty of relevant companies (Didry 1998b). 
In the context of financialization, marked in France by the 
search for the “factoryless” company centred on design 
and conception, and, more generally, by a blurring of 
company boundaries, it could be suggested that the “la-
bour conventions approach” is losing its relevance. Re-
structuring is taking a dramatic turn in which the initial 
“critical” registers are increasingly difficult to apply in the 
face of managerial determination to cut jobs considered too 
expensive. However, dynamics of negotiation are emerging, 
not only to consider the fate of the dismissed employees but 
also to define the substance of the company through its 
work, around agreements to clarify its general outline in 
the future, whether this is through the “forward manage-
ment of employment and skills” [gestion prévisionnelle de 
l’emploi et des competences] or, more directly, through 
the determination of “economic and social units” [unites 
économiques et sociales] (Didry/Jobert 2010). Given these 
dynamics, the “labour conventions approach” has helped 
me better understand the issues of collective mobilization 
and debate deeply rooted in the productive dimensions, 
leaving behind a macro-social analysis which held these 
“micro-mobilizations” to be a negligible quantity and con-
cluded that there was a progressive disappearance of the 
labour movement. It has the great advantage of removing 
the prisms of great social visions such as the “post-
industrial society,” and “post-Fordism,” to return to the 
reflections and analyses of those who through their work 
in the company have measured its possibilities. 
Conclusion 
Based on the regularities that emerge in productive activi-
ties, the “labour conventions approach” has contributed to 
a profound renewal of socio-economic history, leaving 
behind the analysis of a linear evolution that identified a 
succession of historical periods such as Fordism or post-
Fordism. At the same time, it has generated a new per-
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spective on labour law, compared to classic social history 
with its postulate of an irreducible confrontation between 
workers and capitalists leading to the development of a 
body of measures protecting against the most extreme 
forms of exploitation. It has enabled an analysis of the 
historicity of the categories of employees/workers and capi-
talists/bosses/employers, considering juridical frameworks as 
historical categories contributing to the construction of a 
“horizon of meaning” by the actors themselves. What 
emerges is a history open to a plurality of inextricable eco-
nomic and social dynamics in which the future is difficult 
to predict but which can be seen in the activities and pro-
jects of individuals who, while trying to shed light on their 
practices, contribute to the transformation of the institu-
tional and therefore juridical frameworks of their experi-
ence. Labour law is thus an element in a complex process 
of development in which, to the experiences and questions 
which actors develop starting from these categories, re-
sponds the continuous evolution of jurisprudence and 
legislation. 
Claude Didry, sociologist, is senior researcher at the 
CNRS, and director of the research laboratory Institutions 
et Dynamiques Historiques de l’Economie at the Ecole 
normale supérieure de Cachan/Paris. He has recently edited 
(in French, with Annette Jobert) a book on restructuring 
firms. His researches are focused on contemporary and 
historical issues in industrial relations and labour law. 
Endnotes 
1“The wealth of societies in which the capitalist mode of produc-
tion prevails appears as an ‘immense collection of commodities’; 
the individual commodity appears as its elementary form.” (Marx 
1976: 125).  
2“Law is the quintessential form of the symbolic power of nam-
ing that creates the things named, and creates social groups in 
particular.” (Bourdieu 1987: 838). 
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The legalization of economic and social relationships has 
entailed the growth of legal services and has progressively 
changed the way that they are organized. More recently, 
historical rules of organizing the legal profession, in the 
form of a ‘professional order’ (bar association), have re-
cently been undermined by the European Commission 
(2005) because they restrain competition useful to the con-
struction of a market for legal services. Although this project 
of liberalization has not succeeded, professional orders have 
been ensured to renegotiate certain rules (prohibition on 
advertising, multi-disciplinary or fees issues). 
From the case of the French professional order, the pur-
pose of this article is to analyze these institutional changes 
and their setting up in new forms of organization1. Be-
yond (and linked with) economic factors, like the globaliza-
tion of business activities, there are legal factors, like the 
increasing complexity of law (Hadfield 2000). We would 
like to show that these changes are also the result of a more 
individualistic concept of law referring to a liberal political 
philosophy in which politics, in the sense of the manage-
ment of the tensions between different common goods, is 
replaced by the enforcement of ‘individual rights’. 
The activities of lawyers are subject to social and organiza-
tional constraints, but reciprocally, the profession and the 
organization also constitute its support. This will be our 
analysis in the first part, starting from the notion of differ-
ent sources of legal inventiveness, diverse modes of busi-
ness development and their organizational supports. We 
will then examine how the emergence of new forms of 
organization, based on a more corporate logic, calls into 
question the professional rules. From an analytical point of 
view, we stress the normative dimension of these activity 
models and thus the expectations of the actors each one 
other, by referring to a plurality of common goods or 
“conventions of quality” (Boltanski/Thévenot 2006; Ey-
mard-Duvernay et al. 2006). The idea is also to connect 
them more generally to different concepts of law. 
In a second part, we put emphasize on the emergence of 
organizational forms linked to the creation of markets for 
legal services in which law firms act as mediator in the 
absence of properly defined positive law. That will lead us 
to adopt a more endogenous definition of law (rule-
setting), making it possible to see the close connection 
between litigation and provision of advice, which has be-
come today predominant. Beside we link these organiza-
tional changes to a more individualistic concept of law, in 
particular by distinguishing between the various “causes” 
that can be defended by lawyers, which refer to diverse 
models of state intervention. 
In conclusion, we will lead up finally to the consideration 
of two axes of analysis, which in turn will facilitate building 
a typology of the firms: the discretionary power of the 
lawyer towards his client and the narrow coupling of litiga-
tion and legal advice. This typology is referred to different 
ways of organizing the profession, and, more generally, 
different concepts of law and politics. 
From an empirical point of view, we rely on semi-
structured interviews of about thirty lawyers belonging to 
different ‘firms’ (organizations, cabinets) in terms of size, 
location (Paris/province), and legal domains (business and 
corporate law, labor law, family law). 
1. Legal inventiveness and forms of 
organization 
It may be surprising to speak about legal inventiveness in a 
universe that is strongly structured by positive law and in 
which judges are supposed to apply the law. From this 
point of view, this concept would undoubtedly be more 
relevant within the framework of Common Law, which 
some commentators agree to emphasize its adaptability to 
socio-economic changes, allowing greater economic effi-
ciency (Posner 2003). However, even in the tradition 
known as Civil Law, the incompleteness of legal rules im-
plies a very large amount of interpretation by the judges, 
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as well as by the whole set of law professionals (lawyers, 
consultants, etc), whose interactions contribute to stabiliz-
ing case law in a given context. It is because the context 
can vary that the law must also adapt itself and evolve. It is 
also because the context can vary on a temporary basis 
(following a crisis) that the law must adapt to the situation 
(in the event of drought, the law of water use is modified). 
It is also necessary to take account of particular cases, and 
other considerations of justice or equity (Bessy, 2007). 
Concerning the inventiveness of the lawyers' work, we 
simply retain a difference in degree between the two legal 
traditions. This is by more readily stressing the emergence 
of new fields of law, in particular related to economic 
globalization and to the decline of State intervention, and 
to the growth in consulting activities about litigation, or to 
the development of alternative dispute resolution other 
than lawsuits. 
1.1. Various dimensions of the inventiveness of law-
yers 
Far from taking place in a universe where legal decisions 
are perfectly foreseeable, the lawyers' work consists in 
thinking up new solutions to often complex problems. In 
this sense, we can say that the lawyers' activity, according 
to E. Lazega (2001), “is knowledge-intensive, in the sense 
of a `knowledge-in-action' accumulated through experi-
ence and reflected by a ‘sound judgment’ – a term often 
used by colleagues to characterize the quality of profes-
sional work”. This activity based on knowledge and experi-
ence, rather than on heavy investments in technical 
equipment, does not exclude any incorporation of 
knowledge in cognitive artifacts conceived at various or-
ganizational levels. In this perspective, our interviews have 
sought to point out different supports of the lawyers’ ac-
tivities in order to restore the distribution of knowledge 
among individuals and between them and their social-
material environment (Hutchins, 1995). 
The inventiveness of lawyers can occur at the time of the 
court hearing (strategy taking account of the “strengths” 
of the opposing party, rhetoric used for persuading judges, 
choice of the “means”) and at the level of advice (writing a 
contract, doing a transaction, conceiving means of compli-
ance to law in organizations,…). 
This inventiveness contributes to an “economics of singu-
larities” (Karpik 2010) in which emerges the style of a 
lawyer or of a firm (when disciples borrow from the Mas-
ter), or working methods of a firm, professional cultures, 
schools, families (“I went through such firm”). The acquisi-
tion of skills through experience is not separate from the 
idea of sharing values concerning the very activity of law-
yers. This narrow gap between the cognitive and norma-
tive dimensions of training constitutes a strong source of 
professional identification. 
At a later stage, a lawyer builds his reputation within his 
professional circle based on his style and methods; his 
reputation allows him to attract new associates and new 
clients (for example as regards criminal law). It is also a 
basis for a lawyer's professional pride, the defense of a 
practice that is close to love of art (or the law), or the quest 
for excellence. 
Nevertheless, to be detached from this individualistic figure 
of the lawyer, close to a writer, it is important to stress that 
the emergence of new solutions is seldom the fruit of the 
effort of just one player. It results from work shared be-
tween several players, between the latter and their socio-
material environment (role of cognitive artifacts, collections 
of cases, etc) and in particular by the sharing of a language 
which allows to work out new “legal approaches”, to 
change from real-life experience to legal arguments and 
qualifications (Bessy/ Chateauraynaud 1995). These last are 
not inevitably recognized or accepted by the others, and in 
particular by the judges, which is why the lawyer must be 
able to handle rhetoric in order to persuade his listeners. 
The art of persuasion also favors negotiation, a fast-expanding 
activity with the growth of the “Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion” (arbitration, mediation, transaction) and of the “transac-
tions” handled by business law firms. These transactions re-
quire a “true talent for negotiation, a sense of consensus,… 
so as to create a relationship with the opposing party, the 
opposing colleague. It is very important and it is very valued 
by clients” (lawyer in a large British business firm). 
The style of the lawyer, which is the true mark of his per-
sonality, but also his talent as a negotiator, constitutes the 
main basis of his reputation, and of the attachment of his 
clients and his staff. A form of organization for legal activi-
ty already stands out in our mind, which corresponds to 
the traditional, excellent firm, based on the reputation of 
its founder, and where litigation remains the main activity 
or, in any case, the most formative for young lawyers. The 
great criminal lawyers are now given less media coverage 
than renowned business lawyers whom one entrusts with 
questions of honor and of fortune. These renowned firms 
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appreciably expanded by diversifying their activities in or-
der to meet the needs for advice of the large CAC 40 
companies, but acting in court remains the horizon of 
advice. Generally, concerning the working of the profes-
sion, they are rather careful, choosing moderate deregula-
tion. In particular, they do not call into question restrictions 
on advertising, results-based fees and conflicts of interests. 
In fact Parisian firms charge very high fees. 
Far from working alone, the lawyers use resources supplied 
by organizational structures which grow more and more, 
making impossible the exercise of the profession in an 
independent way. In order to understand the emergence 
of new forms of organization in the activities of law firms 
linked with the creation of markets for legal services, it is 
useful to characterize the organizations which, according 
to the model of a large law firm, work according to a true 
corporate logic. 
1.2. Firms that provide legal services 
The “large Anglo-Saxon firms” in general were used as a 
foil in the arguments of the majority of our interviewees 
and were said to cause many of the evils from which the 
profession suffers. However, if we take up again the ar-
guments of the founder of a French business firm (of me-
dium size), his remarks are more moderate. We can base 
ourselves on his arguments to draw a "negative” picture 
of the main features of a large Anglo-Saxon firm and the 
‘conventions of quality’ from which he justifies or criticizes 
the worth of persons and objects. 
He advances the personalization of service and the culture 
of litigation, two elements considered true competitive 
advantages of his firm against the more “industrial” activi-
ty of the Anglo-Saxon firms. These latter are marked by a 
strong division of labor among the lawyers, in particular 
between the provision of advice and litigation. Thus he 
refuses to take part in tenders and tries to avoid all means 
of pinning down his work: invoicing by hour, guides and 
classifications, brochures, all that could bring it closer to a 
service provider dependent on the client. He intends to 
keep his independence of judgment in order to defend the 
true interest of his clients, and in this sense he is opposed 
to contingency fees. Lastly, he grants much importance to 
avoiding conflicts of interest and adds to the formal defini-
tion of these conflicts some thoughts on loyalty towards 
his clients. 
Our interlocutor highlights two different quality conven-
tions, which can be distinguished by the resistance or not 
to any form of formalization of the quality of service, in 
particular using assessment tools specific to a given mar-
ket. On the contrary, the remarks of the manager of a 
large international business firm instance a large depend-
ence on the client (a consequence of the model of the very 
diversified business firm) and, more generally, on the mar-
ket. “These are the market constraints” is the recurring 
statement of our interviewee, constraints that push them 
to accept conflicts of interests: refusal of “exclusive instruc-
tions” coupled with contingency fees. There is the example 
of the sale of a company where many bidders are compet-
ing. The firm can have its teams work for different bidders 
in order to minimize its risk of loss, which supposes setting 
up ‘Chinese walls’ between the competing teams. 
Another form of organization of the activity can be created 
around a “big case” bringing together three or four senior 
partners, in order to define a strategy with the client. In 
the example given by our interlocutor (the sale of a com-
pany), you do not see very clearly the borderline between 
the search for legal guarantees and economic decisions. 
The law is then instrumentalized to the benefit of the 
economy, which is also seen in the fact that the double 
training course became a must, which, on account of short 
supply, entailed a rise in associates’ salaries over recent 
years. Another consequence of the handling of “big cases” 
that require the involvement of several associates or teams 
or departments, is the implementation of a corporate logic, 
the pooling resources, clients in particular, and salaries. 
The representatives of these large firms say that they are 
not affected by the creeping liberalization of the market 
for legal services, in which they take part, and see in a 
favorable light the different steps towards deregulation of 
the profession (advertising, contingency fees, opening up 
of the firms’ capital and more). Inside the domain of busi-
ness law, we are thus confronted to two very different way 
of exercising the profession, of connecting the “market” 
and the political action of the lawyers. But before go fur-
ther on this issue, it is important to examine the economic 
factors explaining the modes of development of law firms. 
1.2. Organizational constraints: from firm to net-
works 
The main features of business firms are their increasing 
size, with specialization by department, and geographical 
coverage in various countries, which is increasing in extent. 
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This form of organization of legal activity is justified eco-
nomically (in reference to the problems of the firm's 
boundaries) by economists such as L. Garicano and T.N. 
Hubbard (2009). They start from the notion that these law 
firms make specialization easier within themselves because 
they constitute a means of information, more efficient 
than the market, on new businesses opportunities. In 
short, the law firm itself constitutes a market intermediary, 
each lawyer being encouraged to pass on the client to a 
colleague when the advice activity of is outside his field of 
expertise. That can lead to a virtuous circle of information 
sharing concerning clients, knowledge, incomes and profits 
of the firm. This strong sharing of resources encourages 
the division of labor. Moreover, the activity of advice to 
clients encourages diversification of fields of law, because 
of the interdependence between the fields where advice 
given (which can lead to team work); whereas the activity 
of litigation is more compartmentalized. 
Thus, authors show that litigation lawyers, who work in 
fields centered around litigation (criminal law, divorce, 
insurance,…), do it in very specialized firms in which clients 
themselves, through their network of personal relations, 
bring new cases to the most famous lawyers in their field. 
Between these two logics, there is place for a hybrid form 
of organization: while evolving within a large firm, lawyers 
at the head of specialized departments own their clients, 
which ensures mobility towards other firms, where they 
sometimes bring their whole teams. This personal capitali-
zation of clients, which is always a source of tension within 
firms, seems more developed, according to our interlocu-
tors, in the United States than in the United Kingdom. In 
any case, it is evidence that uncertainty on the quality of 
the provision of legal services makes networks of interper-
sonal bonds critical to channel clients towards the lawyers 
(Karpik 2010). 
But these various organizational logics should not mask the 
role of advice networks that transcend the borders of 
firms. Beyond the intra-organizational study starting from 
the study of the way of working of a large US business 
firm, E. Lazega (2001) shows the importance of inter-firm 
“advice networks” in the research of legal solutions. These 
networks function like practice communities based on rules 
of reciprocity, exchange of knowledge, but which are not 
free from considerations of status and strategic stakes. 
These rules of exchange rest on the existence of a profes-
sional model (or its functional equivalent), capable of con-
trolling entry into the profession, of sharing certain training 
expenditures and of solving litigations between lawyers as 
well as between the latter and their clients. 
These inter-firms “advice networks” take a more and more 
structured form which can be explained by both the will of 
firms to follow their clients (in particular multi sites compa-
nies) in different geographic places and the quick evolution 
of law requiring high-level and hyper-specialized expertise. 
The domain of labor law offers a good illustration of this 
mode of network organization. 
Indeed, all our interviewees who practice in this field stress 
the rapid development of labor law, so that they seek new 
solutions when case law is not stabilized. This legal innova-
tion, incremental by nature (some people find the term 
innovation too extreme), is facilitated by a certain speciali-
zation in the field and a form of organization that allows 
the fast exchange of information based on common data-
bases and training seminars. This organization can be in-
creased by membership of a network on a national scale or 
European scale, which facilitates maintaining links with 
correspondents who exchange information, provide pro-
fessional advice, transmit or accept files, litigation they can 
follow or act for in court within the jurisdiction of its bar 
association. This mode of network organization, especially 
developed by the firms working on behalf of employers, 
somehow follows the development of the large groups or 
multi-centered firms; these seek to take on the exclusive 
services of a law firm that will be able to handle files, via its 
network of correspondents, for its entire territory and for 
all requested services. As regards labor law, one can also see 
the adequacy with the new authorities representing em-
ployees (Central Works Council, European Works Council) 
and the signature of agreements, or cases as regards em-
ployee representation, which is followed and settled by the 
company’s law firm. 
There again, the agents themselves refer to niche firms 
which are competing through networks. Intensification of 
competition created a form of “race for the niche” in a 
specialized area of labor law that is in turmoil, as though 
there exists a race for patents in the field of technological 
innovation. The idea is that the first who registers the pa-
tent wins the whole market linked to the new product or 
process. In the same way, in labor law, the one who first 
finds the “new product” is likely to be acknowledged as 
the hyper-specialized firm on this matter and thus to at-
tract the greatest number of clients in this new market2. 
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This logic of attachment of clients, primarily made up of 
multi-national companies, based on the brand of a net-
work of firms, has been extended to other legal profes-
sionals than lawyers. That raises the issue of multi-
disciplinary structures of activity, which are forbidden in 
France, and that of advertising restrictions. The debate on 
advertising was based on attacking international networks 
that advertise law firms3. 
Beside, this redefinition of professional standards consti-
tutes an important limit to self-regulation by the profes-
sion. This applies in particular to what relates to “conflicts 
of interests”, of which E. Lazega (2001) shows that they 
can only increase as the size of the firms increases. This 
raises the question of the invention of a form of regulation 
negotiated between the profession and the State, by which 
a form of external control could prevail. Indeed, the limits of 
opportunist behaviors regulation within firms (shirking: to 
steal a client or to leave with clients), which disturbs the 
accumulation and division of the human and social capital of 
the organization, hinder compliance with strict ethical rules 
by which the legal profession regulates itself. 
2. Forms of organization, building and 
nature of law 
We propose to link these organizational changes to a legal 
regulation which lies on a contractual process whose 
standards are defined by the large firms, in the absence of 
a truly applicable law. This role of mediation played by 
lawyers can be characterized according to different process 
of construction of legal rules and of their meaning. This 
mediation role contributes to a more endogenous con-
struction of law and leads to consider lawyers as ‘law in-
termediaries’4. But, these organizational changes can also 
be interpreted in reference to a more individualistic con-
cept of law. 
2.1. The role of mediator for large business firms 
The interest of the analysis of Emmanuel Lazega (2001) is 
not only to highlight the links between forms of organiza-
tion and the market for legal services, but to do it in rela-
tion to the contribution of large business firms to the very 
definition of the rules of law. Thus multiple representa-
tions, at the origin of potential conflicts of interest, can still 
have the advantages of a form of unofficial arbitration. 
This role of mediation would be particularly important in 
international, commercial contracts in the absence of true 
business law and stabilized market rules. The large busi-
ness firms can be regarded as powerful players for globali-
zation. Because they are permanently in “conflicts of inter-
ests”, they have an important power of arbitration in 
commercial contracts between multinational firms (they 
hold information about the two sides) and play a part in 
respect of them or in their possible renegotiation. 
This role of go-between has also developed in finance and 
in particular in big international mergers and acquisitions. 
In the absence of applicable law, the large law firms pro-
vided standards for documents, contracts and written 
agreements, procedures, and have at the same time con-
tributed to building the international financial market and 
the market for law. In becoming experts in the field, “opin-
ion leaders”, they take part in national or international 
regulation, especially as regards stock exchange law 
(Quack 2007). In this way, large business firms constitute 
necessary stages for international business and finance, 
which confers on them a position of strength vis-à-vis their 
clients and the international regulation authorities. 
To fine tune Lazega’s analysis, we would stress that private 
international law, through the impetus of international 
conventions and Community law, conveys both in conflicts 
of laws and jurisdictions, a large variety of solutions that 
are within a continuum between two poles: individual will 
(the contract) and various neo-statutory ways of control 
(police laws, exclusive jurisdictions, the theory of legal rights 
or fundamental rights) to take up again the argument of 
one lawyer. The actual border between private law and 
public law is redefined. The same holds for labor law. 
We would like now to put forward some additional analyt-
ical elements in order to analyze the links between the 
organization of legal activities and the development of law, 
which results in having a more endogenous notion of law. 
2.2. An endogenous law 
One can refer here to the approach of L. Edelman (2003), 
an American sociologist of law, who defends an endoge-
nous notion of law. She shows how the practice of law 
professionals, concerning civil rights as regards employ-
ment in the United States, fits in with a double process of 
“managerialization” of the law and “legalization” of or-
ganizations at the crossroads between the legal and organ-
izational fields. Because of the abstract and ambiguous 
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character of these civil rights, lawyers in particular, by 
means of their consulting activity, collectively build models 
of compliance with the law that integrate organizations’ 
objectives of efficiency and profitability. 
Lawyers make known changes in the law and the new risks 
run by organizations because of patterns of litigation. They 
write in websites or professional newspapers and give 
training courses to other lawyers and managers, which are 
so many means for the objectivity of lawyers’ quality. They 
may also work as consultants for non-specialized lawyers 
and especially for in-house legal counsel within organiza-
tions. In this way, they maintain very close links with both 
corporate management and with other management con-
sulting firms. This activity makes it possible to single out 
“models” of compliance with the law and to assess better 
the possibilities of a lawsuit and the responsibility of com-
panies. In this respect, they can exaggerate the threats 
(sources of legal insecurity) represented by the law, in 
order to enhance their power and their status within the 
companies, in particular in matter of dismissals. 
As these constructions of the law become institutionalized, 
they gradually affect other protagonists in the employment 
relationship (including the judges) and the way in which 
they understand the significance of the law and rational 
conformity to the latter. Edelman raises the risk of ineffi-
ciency of the law in the sense that it does not achieve its 
initial objectives as regards, for example, the fight against 
discrimination. A whole set of compliance tools (e.g. inter-
nal arbitration) acquire a formal aspect without true, sub-
stantial content. 
Such an analysis, stressing the irrigation of the fabric of the 
law through organizational practices, can easily apply to 
the other fields of law and of regulation of business activi-
ties which make refer to general principles (health, compe-
tition, bankruptcy, and environment). Developed within 
the framework of legal, liberal logic and common law, it 
can be used in a “civil law” country, although the roles of 
the courts and the training of the magistrates are different. 
The development of fundamental social rights, close to 
American civil rights as regards employment, gives way to 
the same type of involvement of French labor law firms 
that “europeanize” themselves via their networks. The 
influence of law firms on the definition of case law consti-
tutes one of the main dimensions of their legal inventive-
ness, which in a way partakes of building the common 
good, but which is not devoid of challenges and conflicts 
between various groups in society. 
2.3. A more individualistic notion of law 
The international extension of lawyers' activities raises the 
question of their regulation by supra-state authorities, such 
as European institutions, which do not have true sover-
eignty. From here comes a policy of deregulation of the 
legal profession that does not truly propose re-regulation 
which would imply defining common values likely to set up 
a true political community. This is the idea of normative 
coherence between the internal practice of the profession 
and external philosophy likely to set up a society. The de-
regulation policy only calls for an increase in the competi-
tion mechanisms that make the clients kings. However, 
one might think that, behind the idea that “clients” can 
achieve a high quality service at the best price, there is also 
the idea that the client is able to define his rights, to put 
forward his claims to this or that right; which leads to 
permanent competition between each one's claims to his 
right, without any political authority determining a priori a 
hierarchy among rights. 
The lawyers are then enlisted in this competition, being 
able to be used as mediator between parties with compet-
ing claims, just as easily being able to make equitable 
standards emerge, such as, conversely, defending the rights 
of the strongest to the detriment of those of the weakest. In 
the absence of a true professional model that gives life to a 
discussion space in which “causes" or “principles of justice” 
are debated or defended (Boltanski/Thévenot 2006), it then 
becomes more problematic to assess the quality of lawyer's 
services on a “macro” level. 
From this view point, it seems to us that the emergence of 
new “professional practices”, which are not well clarified, 
is to be related to a more individualistic notion of law (each 
one seeking to defend his right via his lawyer), preferring 
the “Alternative Dispute Resolution” (in short ADR, i.e. 
arbitration, mediation, transaction), where the lawyers 
tend to be negotiators between divergent individual inter-
ests, rather than interpreters of substantive law or media-
tors between local and general interests. One of the con-
sequences of the “ADR” is to “privatize” the law (and 
justice), which then loses its characteristic of being a “pub-
lic good” and an incentive to prudent behaviors. Another 
consequence is to limit the public and democratic debates 
concerning values. 
These professional changes can also be connected to a 
more procedural notion of the law, based upon the idea of 
a greater autonomy of the actors in the process of building 
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rules (with an increased number of negotiation agreements 
as in labor law, or all kinds of pacts or charters), showing 
up the withdrawal of the State in the definition of substan-
tial rights. These rights facilitated the fight against social 
inequalities and were thus strongly associated with an 
overall political plan, relying on a powerful administration 
and public funds. The transformation of “administrative 
bodies” into “agencies” which contract between them or 
with “private partners”, by referring to objectives to reach, 
gives a good illustration of more horizontal social relation-
ships and of the predominance of incentive mechanisms 
upon the regulations (administrative rules or statutory 
decrees). From a general point of view, these processes of 
contractualization, in which lawyers can play an essential 
role, contribute to the redefinition of the different con-
cepts of “contract” and “legality” (Supiot 2003)5. 
One can wonder whether we get closer to the traditional 
role of lawyers defending a form of political liberalism, 
namely a moderate intervention by the State, the promo-
tion of civic freedoms and good representation of the 
interests of civil society (Halliday/Karpik/Feeley 2007). But 
the defense of the modern rule of law, based on autono-
mous individuals having fundamental rights, can take dif-
ferent forms and refer to diverse concepts of political free-
dom. For instance, the English-inspired political freedom, 
which distinguishes the spontaneous activities of civil socie-
ty and the limited responsibilities of the State, is different 
from our model of political freedom (in continental Europe) 
where the State acts as guarantor of the common good, 
and the development of substantive law aims at establish-
ing a set of priorities between various categories of com-
mon good that are always open to debate. 
The risk of an individualistic notion that regards law as an 
individual freedom (or empowerment) is to make a mis-
leading amalgam between all the “rights to”, in not disso-
ciating the rights which refer to possibilities of action, such 
as the right of expression or freedom to do things, from 
rights relating to things that can be allotted, not without 
competition, and which pose problems of social justice, of 
the distribution of resources. 
Defending “individual rights” without being forced to go 
back to one form or another of common good is likely to 
invalidate the existence of a professional model that facili-
tates deliberation around a plurality of values. As a young 
lawyer working in a business firm puts it, what brings law-
yers together is the fact that they all seek to defend the 
position of their client in the name of the (purely subjec-
tive) principle that everyone has the right to be defended.  
It is thus important to distinguish between the various 
“causes” that can be defended by lawyers, which refer to 
various political philosophies and models of involvement by 
the State. A difference must be made between the “caus-
es” which lead to legislative production (statutory law) 
giving a priori real rights to individuals, accompanying by 
public measures providing material resources to make 
these rights effective, and those which are not instituted; 
The latter aim at assure minimal guarantees in situations of 
“crisis”, in respect to ethical principles. According to this 
second perspective, the lawyers appear as defending ethi-
cal norms which are not respected. Intervening after the 
emergence of injustices, they recall to the members of the 
society their duty to honor their “imperfect obligations”6. 
In fine, the intervention of lawyers can also generate an 
increasing “judicialization” of economic and social rela-
tionships if the lawyers do not play their role of arbitrator 
between the state of the law, always likely to be manipu-
lated by one of the two parties, and the means of coopera-
tion arranged by these parties in order to control their daily 
interaction (Bessy 2007). We can think that the risk of 
strategic use of law is especially high as the benefit of 
economic interest is stronger. 
3. A plurality of law firms 
In conclusion, we can propose a typology of the firms 
around their respective positioning on two main axes char-
acterizing their activities and their relationships with their 
clients, and by connecting this position with their concept 
of the profession and, more generally, the law. 
We can ground the typology of firms by using the concept 
of “quality conventions”, produced by economics of con-
vention and neo structural sociology. Both empirical and 
theoretical research has shown that competition through 
quality, in order to achieve stability in a viable market envi-
ronment, requires an implicit agreement on the type of 
quality valued by clients. Indeed each case evokes a differ-
ent perception of quality by the client: inspired quality 
(client's expectations centered on creativity), industrial 
quality (client’s expectations based on efficiency), market 
(or merchant) quality (client's expectations centered on 
obtaining the international standard at the best cost), civic 
quality (client's expectations related to a certain vision of 
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general interest expressed by lawyer), domestic quality 
(client's expectations related to his confidence in the law-
yer's ability to handle his personal file completely). 
Figure 1, see Appendix 
A first axis posits the firms that develop legal strategy to-
gether with their client, against those firms that have a 
greater discretionary scope to set up files and whose main 
activity is rooted in litigation. This opposition does not rest 
completely on the nature of the clients of the firms (com-
panies, private individuals) or on fields of the law. 
It takes up the distinction suggested by L. Karpik (2010) 
between a “traditional professional system” and a “private 
professional system”. In the “traditional professional sys-
tem”, the “market” and the political action of lawyers are 
linked since they provide personalized services that can be 
in various forms and be produced with a concern of indi-
vidual and collective independence, and supervised by 
control systems that allow adjusting the risks, which the 
lawyer will allow the client to run, to the available confi-
dence. For Karpik, the risk today with the “private profes-
sional system” is that “politics”, in the sense of defense of 
fundamental freedoms or the building of new “causes”, 
disappears while there only remains regulation of the eco-
nomic activity of lawyers, starting from the removal of 
impediments to competition. 
On our side, we emphasize the risk that “politics” is re-
duced to the only possibility of each client of defending his 
right as he sees fit, without necessarily going back to a 
form of common good guaranteed by the State. 
The hypothesis that we have advanced in this contribution 
is that the diffuse evolution towards a “private professional 
system” lies on an individualistic political and legal philos-
ophy, in the sense where this liberal philosophy conse-
crates “individual rights”. On one side, these individual 
rights are mainly the results of a contractual process in 
which each party seek to negotiate according to his proper 
interests. On the other side, it belongs to each one to rein-
force his right and to have recourse to courts in order to 
claim justice. In such a configuration, we understand how 
certain actors seek systematically to acquire legal guaran-
tees, in particular according to the importance of their 
(economic) investments, and thus have recourse to the 
advices of a lawyer. They contribute to the setting up and 
extension of “markets” for legal services. 
A second axis makes it possible to oppose the firms ac-
cording to whether they closely connect “the provision of 
advice” and “litigation”, by more or less creating case-law 
in a precise field, a niche; and those where these two activ-
ities are disconnected, practicing either of them, or the 
other, but in cases that remain relatively simple and which 
are suited to a form of standardization of the service: legal 
monitoring for the “provision of advice”, divorce by mutu-
al consent or legal aid, for the “litigation”. 
In the fields of business firms, one can oppose the “well 
known French firms” that defend in a very personalized 
way the interest of their clients, by carrying out “tailor-
made” work and by inventing new legal solutions, and the 
“large Anglo-Saxon firms”, which follow standard proce-
dures allowing the coordination of players over wide mar-
kets. This opposition itself is built by lawyers, in particular 
those who attack market logic in the name of a convention 
of quality that takes the interest of the client more into 
account, with reference to a form of “public good” or a 
widening of the private interests, leading to a form of 
agreement and allowing to safeguard a cooperative rela-
tionship. This attack on the “market” also argues in favor 
of moderate deregulation of the profession. 
When these two axes are crossed, four ideal-types of firms 
are obtained (see Figure 1 in Appendix) even if, in practice, 
all the firms combines different forms of coordination of 
their activities. 
 The cause lawyers who build and defend causes, and 
who appear in a position of authority in their field of ex-
pertise. These lawyers seek to innovate at the legal level 
and to influence the building of the law in order to protect 
the most unprotected. This is in this sense that the civic 
dimension is predominant. 
 The traditional lawyers who work in relatively simple 
litigation, like legal aid, while taking care of setting-up of 
files and by exerting their discretionary power. When the 
relationship with their clients is more and more close, that 
leads to a domestic quality of the service. 
The two other types of firms act more in the form of a co-
production of their clients’ legal strategy, which tends less 
to go beyond the request expressed by the client. The risk 
of manipulation of the law for the benefit of economic 
interest is stronger. 
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 The large firms providing standard advice organize 
their activity in the manner of a company and services 
providers that seek to meet the needs of their clients by 
standardizing their methods, or while keeping in line with 
the standards of the law market, in order to increase their 
productivity by a certain division of labor (industrial quali-
ty). Clients are attached to the brand of “the firm” or the 
“network” rather than to the partners. They are large An-
glo-Saxon firms that are highly diversified with offices all 
around the world, French firms specialized in the provision 
of advice and creating network bonds with other consulting 
professionals. They call into question the most of the profes-
sional rules and favor the emergence of a market order. 
 The “haute couture” firms are the source of a new 
private professional system based on both the provision of 
advice, seeking to answer accurately to the needs of cli-
ents, and on the search for new legal solutions, in the 
absence of well-established applicable law. Their activity as 
skillful negotiator or referee is developed in configurations 
where it is important to maintain a cooperative framework 
between the players. And in this sense, they become ex-
perts in their field and develop client loyalty. The mainte-
nance of this capacity for expertise and permanent legal 
inventiveness (see supra, § 1.1) is a limit to the diversifica-
tion (and standardization) of their activities, and supposes 
forms of on-the-job training. 
To conclude, we can wonder whether the current profes-
sional Order is able to manage, to give meaning to the 
variety of these organizational forms. In any case, its dif-
fuse decline due to the predominance of a market order 
risks calling into question the quality of the rule of law. Or 
said in another manner, is the governance of economy and 
regulations of markets must be the main objective of the 
legal system? An author like Hadfield (2000) shows that in 
a such legal system driven by corporate demand, this is the 
business client group that ultimately determines pricing in 
the market for legal services at the expenses of the less 
wealthy personal client group. That raises the issue of 
achievement of justice in society. 
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Endnotes 
1This contribution is part of the final report of a collective rese-
arch launched by French CNB (National Association of Bars) which 
has been directed by O. Favereau (2010). This report shows the 
interest of professional order (versus a market order) for ma-
naging the quality of legal service. 
2According to Hadfield (2000), complexity and unpredictability of 
law are “responsible for the winners-take-all dynamics that struc-
ture successive tournaments among lawyers, tournaments in 
which winning may reflect only negligible quality differences in 
fact”. 
3We can refer to the three large international networks: Ernst & 
Young, Price Waterhouse and KPMG, which include legal, audit-
ing and consulting departments. 
4We have particularly developed this notion of ‘law intermediary’ 
in the analysis of the regulation of economic activities in order to 
point out the fact that legal professionals contribute to the link 
between different normative orders (Bessy/Delpeuch/Pélisse 
2011). 
5The reflection followed by A. Supiot, in this paper, overtakes the 
distinction between ‘law’ and ‘contract’ in order to take into 
account the emergence of new conceptions both of the law 
(legislative power whose one part is transferred to the social 
partners) and of the contract which, in the absence of contractual 
liberty, becomes an enslavement device. The author underlines 
that this enslavement is likely to concern, not only, the employees, 
but also, all the actors, including public administration, via a set of 
norms and indicators who condition their behaviour. 
6This is the concept of “rights” defended by A. Sen (2004) when 
he seeks to analytically extend the “Human rights” to “economic 
and social rights” without passing by their prior legislative codifi-
cation in order to avoid the legalisation of ethical norms. 
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Advice and litigation
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by the lawyer 
only
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of the service
Cause-Lawyer 
CIVIC CONVENTION 
Traditional litigation 
lawyer  
DOMESTIC CONVENTION
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The way business is shaped by conventional norms and 
controlled by legal regulation has been the object of much 
investigation. Neo-institutional studies have offered in-
depth inquiries into organizations to show how accepted 
social conventions modulate competition and the interac-
tions between economic partners within the business 
world (Rizza 2008). Economics of convention (in short EC), 
despite its difference with neo-institutional approaches 
(Favereau 2011), has insisted on the importance of these 
conventions (Diaz-Bone/Thévenot 2010), to understand the 
models of firms, the stock market exchanges, the function-
ing of market professionals or recruitment. This has also 
proven true concerning the practices of accounting and 
business management (Hopwood/Miller 1994; Chap-
man/Cooper/Miller 2009; Chiapello/Gilbert 2009). More 
recently, economic sociology as EC had developed their 
interest for the role of law and the articulation between 
conventions and legal rules. Swedberg (2009) introduce 
comments to a special issue of this newsletter, proposing 
two topics that need to be better understood, Roman law 
and financial law, two legal environments that we develop 
exactly in our contribution. Towards EC and derivating 
from the observation that firms are not legally grounded 
(contrary to societies and labor), recent works develops the 
necessity to rethink the great deformation of firms, their 
legal responsibility and who own them (Favereau 2012). 
Other works analyze the role of intermediaries as lawyers 
or judges, and how such specific professional markets are 
working or transformed in last years (on business lawyers, 
see Bessy 2012 in this issue). 
The aim of this study is thus to examine the often over-
looked and yet essential category of forensic expert wit-
nesses in accounting, finance and business management 
known in France as French forensic experts in economics 
(”FFEE”). As professionals in business litigation, these ex-
perts are regularly appointed for business valuations, asset 
accounting and profitability analyses, inquiries into part-
nership disputes and business misconducts, criminal finan-
cial flows tracking, such as unfair competition: their reports 
are summoned to inform and advise judges on the facts 
underlying a business dispute. Because they are regularly 
appointed by the judges1 and provide, directly or not, an 
assessment of the fairness of business practices, this paper 
will show that FFEE are also key players in the definition of 
the conventions governing business in France. They are not 
only specialists inscribing an expertise within a specific field 
of Justice. They are at the very heart of business and al-
ready have a professional activity as accountants, statutory 
auditors, finance managers, and so on. By focusing on 
FFEE and their activities, this study illuminates the role and 
practices of unknown but key actors, symbolizing typically 
“intermediaries of law” highlighted by the contributions in 
Bessy, Delpeuch and Pélisse (2011) and participating to the 
elaboration and transformation of business and judicial 
conventions. 
1. Methods, data, theoretical framework 
To analyze who the accredited forensic experts really are 
and what they really do, several methods and types of data 
were used in an initial comparative study on forensic ex-
pert witnesses in economics, psychiatry and linguistics 
(Pélisse/Charrier/Larchet/Protais 2012). Sent to nearly 1000 
FFEE identified through the 35 lists of the appeal courts 
and the supreme court, a detailed questionnaire was re-
turned by 144 experts. Regarding the information readily 
available on the lists concerning the age, sex, seniority and 
location of all the accredited experts in finance economics 
of France, these 15% appear as broadly representative of 
the whole. 
A second type of data was obtained through extensive 
interviews with 15 experts on the lists of the appeal courts 
of Aix-en-Provence, Lille, Lyon, Paris and Versailles. Five 
judges, three of them were responsible for the experts 
listed by the appeal court, were also interviewed to gather 
the views of the courts. 
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We used the theoretical framework of the EC to illuminate 
these data. Indeed, this perspective allows us to under-
stand how, in each trial and mission, FFEE have to manage, 
help and equip the ways one or many conventions “pass a 
test” and contribute to the evolution, stabilization or 
changes of the convention(s). In this sense, forensics in 
economics are not only intermediaries. They are also active 
mediators between the judge and the parties and the aims 
of this paper is to enter into the ways they assume and 
develop this role which transforms them as depositary of 
conventions of business (for the judge) but also conven-
tions of justice (for the litigants). In this sense, this position 
makes forensics in economics more than a filter and rather 
a turntable and an analytical key entry point to study the 
intertwined business and judicial conventions of economic 
life, if we consider conventions as “general principles of 
good and fair, grounded in provisions which allow to eval-
uate situations” (Eymard-Duvernay 2009). 
2. The French legal forensic model: a lack of 
conventions? 
For over two centuries now, judges in France have relied 
on specialists in economics, commerce and finance, to 
answer their queries and help them determine economic 
facts under litigation (Charrier 2007; Charrier/Labelle 
2009). In 1913, these specialists formed an association of 
forensic accountants next to the Trial Court of the Seine, 
before forging several other associations, such as the large-
ly dominant national association of forensic accountants 
(CNECJ), the national association of forensic experts in 
business and technical services (CNEACT) or the national 
association of experts in finance and business auditing 
(CNEFD). As Dumoulin (2007) has clearly shown, the activi-
ty of the members of these associations is largely codified 
by law. The rule of law is thus the first influence on the 
practices of forensic witnessing, since it builds the institu-
tional framework of forensics and defines the ideal expert. 
In the German context, all forensic experts are civil serv-
ants. In general, in the Anglo-Saxon context, each party 
provides their own experts. Because of this, the legal 
framework of forensic witnessing in France is considered as 
very specific (Jasanoff/Lynch 1998; Prichard 2005; La-
belle/Saboly 2008; Charrier/Escobosa/Leclerc 2011). In-
deed, it articulates the continental position, which relies on 
expertise initiated, controlled and conducted solely for the 
benefit of a judge, while at the same time depending on 
an accredited pool of specialists from each area of exper-
tise that a judge may require. The three main features of 
this unique system emerge from the texts of the various 
codes framing French procedures and justice (Moussa 
2008; Dumoulin 2007). 
The first feature is that forensic experts are, above all, 
technicians, hired to assist judges on technical and non-
legal issues. Because they have the adequate specialized 
and scientific knowledge, they are able to forward learned 
opinions and to collect, organize and assess information, 
by adequately managing the evidence adduced by the 
complainants and defendants. Unlike Anglo-Saxon experts, 
however, they cannot make a profession out of treating 
the financial aspects of litigation. 
The second feature concerns the existence of lists of ex-
perts, from which judges can freely draw. Every year, the 
French courts of appeals compile and update these lists, 
accrediting for five years specialists by field of activity: medi-
cine, construction, psychiatry, economy & finance, etc.; and 
then by sub-specialty: neurology, acoustics or corporate 
finance, for example. Anglo-Saxon experts, on the other 
hand, do their best to be identified by lawyers, even if they 
cultivate objectivity and technical competence to be admit-
ted as genuine forensic experts, and not just as witnesses 
before a judge (Dwyer 2008). 
The third important feature concerns the extremely detailed 
jurisprudential and procedural framework within which 
forensic examinations are to be carried out. Without detail-
ing the whole procedure here, one can note that, at the 
term of their missions, FFEE must submit a report to the 
judge. In civil and criminal cases alike, these reports are 
theoretically purely informational: they may be brought to 
bear witness during a trial or they may be purely and simp-
ly shelved. Moreover, the experts are not commissioned to 
attempt to reconcile the parties involved, even though 
their work may eventually do so. Again, the situation of 
Anglo-Saxon experts differs: most of their work takes place 
in court, while they are publicly supporting their reports or 
answering the questions of the adverse party during cross-
examination. 
Finally, a series of normative texts draw up a model for 
forensic expertise, which typically resembles the “decision-
ist” model of expertise defined by Habermas (1978). 
“Based on an axiological divide between the one who 
decides and the one who advises, and taking for granted 
the subordination of the second to the first, it has become 
an archetypal form, a sort of pre-theory spontaneously 
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mobilized to describe forensic expertise and more broadly 
any kind of expertise” notes Dumoulin (2007, p. 26). At a 
European level too, as goes to show a decision by the 
Court of Justice of the European Community (Penajora, 
March 17, 2011), forensic experts are plainly defined as 
experienced service providers. Such definitions keep exper-
tise under strict control, by ultimately imposing an absolute 
subordination of all experts to their missions. 
In sum, what draws the legal framework of expertise in 
France is an expert who help the judge by illuminating the 
facts – and only the facts –, without any role of qualifica-
tion neither interpretation. In this view, there is finally no 
conventions in this activity, which is absolutely framed by 
the rule of law, letting to the expert a sole technical exper-
tise grounded on his professional skills and his specific 
knowledge of accountant, finance manager or economist. 
3. A practical and ambiguous status oscillating 
between various representations 
Yet, as L. Dumoulin (2007) has also shown, the model 
represented in the legal texts, supported by the expecta-
tions of magistrates and by the expert associations, is nei-
ther empirically nor heuristically valid. Indeed, FFEE neces-
sarily express, more or less openly, several technical op-
tions, which are also choices having conventional back-
ground. The missions resulting of trials are peculiar occa-
sions for the specialist of accounting or economy appoint-
ed by a judge to open the black boxes that are the figures 
or other measures considered as objectiving or describing 
the reality of firms or business relations. Experts have to 
seek information, evaluate their relevance, put to test them 
and make numbers talk, even unmask realities beyond 
arguments and columns of figures. In other words, FFEE 
express the conventional nature of the management tools 
and the reductionist operation, which transmutes reality 
into figures. 
By making this activity, FFEE import value judgments, 
which have several possible effects. They have to present 
written reports characterized by neutrality. For that, they 
conclude often their demonstration by relating two or 
more options for the judge, letting him the decision, even if 
the experts can highlight or even influence one reasoning 
more than one other. Experts stage-manage their neutrality 
by presenting the plurality of possible judgments depending 
how they consider the facts, e.g how they interpret them 
and the information they have for their mission. 
As to the judges, though they are indeed the only judges 
and are in no way legally bound by the expertise, they are 
nonetheless dependent of the reports they have commis-
sioned and are submitted, at least in part, to the authority 
of science and specialized knowledge. The conventional 
role of forensic in economics is thus not only inscribed in 
their activity but also real through the influence they could 
have on the judge, that is to say on the judicial decision 
and finally the law. 
Even the recent and important decision of Penajora men-
tioned above reveals more ambiguous than the simple 
expression of the decisionnist model of expertise. Indeed, 
the European Court of Justice questioned if the French 
forensic expert could influence the judicial verdict of the 
judge. Its negative answer is explicitly due to Mr. Penajora 
specialty (translator and interpreter), which is, for the main 
experts and judges, not real legal experts (see chapter 4 
written by Larchet in Pélisse 2012). In other words, the 
question is of great interest for main forensic experts, show-
ing that their participation to the verdict needs to be assert-
ed, despite the codes prohibitions of such possibility. The 
present status of forensics is thus really debated, revealing 
how various conventions could regulate this activity. 
It follows that the general figure of FFEE oscillates between 
two opposite representations. The first and most common 
is that of a technical specialist, a connoisseur of the habits 
and customs of his art, a provider of skills for the benefit of 
justice. From the perspective of legal specialists (Frison-
Roche/Mazeaud 1995), the “decisionist” model leads to 
identifying the expert as a fair-minded professional, anx-
ious to serve the institution. The second common represen-
tation of the expert is that of a judge’s delegate, a person 
in charge of the resolution of the dispute from a technical 
perspective. From this point of view, the FFEE conclusion 
settles the factual dispute between the parties. Experts can 
thus be accused of usurping the role of the judge and 
benefit from the legitimacy of the judiciary. They become 
notables, identified by their unique social position rather 
than their professional skills. 
Such opposing representations are of particular importance 
when it comes to specialists in accounting, management 
and finance. Indeed, is it not said today that finance gov-
erns society? Even the law and its institutions must today 
be economically efficient. This economic rationale implies 
that every decision, every ruling has a cost – if not a price – 
and is thus of the competence of accountants. It can be 
imagined that FFEE could play the first role within the ex-
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pert/judge couple. To rise these opposite representations 
or even fears, the perspective of EC could exactly be fruit-
ful. Indeed, it offers theoretical concepts, tools and reason-
ing which allow to understand what are doing concretely 
the experts, how they play a role of intermediary and ac-
tive contributor of the conventions, if we define them as 
“collective frameworks upon which the players are sup-
ported in their conflicts and assessments in public” (Diaz-
Bone/Thévenot 2010). Experts influence particularly the 
ways legal compliance is considered, defined, and used by 
the parties and the judges (Edelman/Stryker 2005). Be-
cause the sense of compliance is intertwined between 
business sphere and legal norms, forensics in economics 
are discrete but key actors, with others, whose contribute 
to the managerialization of the law and the legalization of 
the business (Edelman 2011). But what are concretely 
doing the experts? 
4. What are experts doing? From a business to a craft 
The judicial missions given to FFEE are various, though 
most involve monitoring and verifying the standards of 
business relations. Three main types of mission thus struc-
ture the activity of FFEE. 
The first one consists in establishing the accounts between 
litigious parties; that is to say, to observe and quantify the 
liabilities of both. Such missions can require a high level of 
technical accounting, such as when quantifying the respec-
tive business activity of partner companies. 33% to 50% 
of all missions fall into this category (including or not di-
vorce and inheritance cases) and ¾ of the experts report-
ing it as 1 out of 2 appointments by year. This first type of 
mission should be distinguished from another type, which 
essentially calls for the intervention of an accountant: this 
is the case in 5.4% of missions during which FFEE are 
summoned to comment on the quality of annual accounts. 
Missions tracing financial flows likely to be of a criminal 
nature (abuse of corporate assets) are a third type, repre-
senting 2.5% of cases. It is thus already obvious that mis-
sions requiring pure accountancy skills represent but a 
minority of all missions, yet accountants represent the 
majority of the experts engaged in forensic economics (see 
below). These forensic missions can be highly complex 
affairs, which reach into the very heart of the business 
world. An expertise and its conclusions thus contribute to 
the definition of the standards of good business conduct 
and to how conflicts between parties can be resolved. 
Yet, in 1 out of 3 cases, experts are commissioned to com-
pute economic damage due to partnership dissolutions, 
industrial incidents, family disputes, construction litiga-
tions, unfair competition and so on. This type of mission, 
during which financial specialists contend with account-
ants, is at the heart of expertise. More explicitly than in the 
“settling the accounts between parties” type of mission, 
experts must enquire into the way business strategies are 
managed, can be predicted, are anticipated, are built. 
Auditing of companies represents the last and least fre-
quent type of mission commissioned by judges (13%). This 
involves the possible intervention of several competing 
groups of experts, each offering a different way of broach-
ing business valuation. The perception the judges have of 
such cases and their judicial decisions will thus depend on 
the specializations and particular competencies of the 
experts involved and on the ways and means of their au-
dits. But, most of the time, what makes a difference – and 
also clearly indicates what is expected of experts in general 
–, has less to do with the specific professional abilities of 
experts in accounting or those in finance, than to the skills 
and knowledge that either can have. 
Like for forensic accountant in common law, skills and 
activities needed for these missions are not those that the 
professionals make use of most in their usual professional 
activities. As shows the way judges appoint indifferently 
specialized experts, the real skills expected from FFEE have 
very little to do with their professions. In other words, 
different and specific conventions are used and performed 
by accountants and auditors when acting as legal experts. 
For example, timeliness is of importance, as 40-hour mis-
sions can take up to 18 months to accomplish. According 
to FFEE having answered the questionnaire, a quarter of all 
missions last between 4 and 6 months, while another 
quarter last between 13 to 18 months, and this regardless 
of the number of hours of the mission itself. This spread in 
time implies strict scheduling, requiring from the expert a 
capacity to build, stick and report an agenda that depends 
largely on the attitudes of litigious parties, and not, as in 
accountancy and auditing activities, on predictable season 
from one year to the next. Beyond their technical 
knowledge and regardless of their professional skills as 
accountants, auditors, managers in banking or finance, 
experts must also have organizational, procedural and 
relational skills and knowledge. 
These skills are different from those required in profession-
al context: accountants keep and organize accounts, assist 
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companies in implementing the good management and 
legality of its daily practice, develop budgets and forecasts, 
book annual accounts of corporations, audit them, and so 
on. It is a very organized occupation, which uses software 
tools and paper procedures, framed by standard attitudes 
and tasks and guaranteed by the periodic quality controls 
of the order of accountants (Ramirez 2005). It is also an 
occupation that “produces” without the need for much 
contact with clients. Moreover, though accountants must 
be able to justify their recommendations in the face of the 
law, their work remains somewhat opaque. This is also 
true for auditing, an activity occupied by most accountants 
and forensic experts. Auditing is even more “invisible” 
than accounting and even more standardized and empow-
ering, and is in no way limited to certifying accounts, or 
sitting on board meetings. The time scales of their mis-
sions, destined to reach their term with an audit report or 
the closing of the accounts, are also very marked. The high 
degree of normalization, the importance of technical and 
computer-assisted accounting and auditing tools, the re-
sponsibilities of these professionals who have an obligation 
of discretion concerning their work, encourage the de-
ployment of a bureaucratic organization and industrial 
conventions. Set methods, the division of labour, delega-
tion, reporting are the daily means of the professional 
practice of such experts in their main activity (Power 1997). 
Experts involved in management, business valuation or 
finance, know all about these issues and some are even 
engaged in similar industrialized organizations during their 
usual professional activities. 
Forensic expertise, on the other hand, is quite different. In 
the French legal system, the accused must be able to con-
tradict the allegations they face, transforming any expertise 
into a collective affair, led by the commissioned expert, but 
influenced by the lawyers of the parties or the parties 
themselves. Indeed, experts depend wholly on information 
that the parties are willing to give them. Moreover, the 
contradictory principle requires dialogue. Experts, even 
though preceded by their reputations or experience, are 
under the obligation to hear the arguments exchanged, to 
explain their own reasoning and to specify the sources of 
the usages they base their recommendations on. Each and 
every mission is conditioned by situations, which are abso-
lutely unique. This uniqueness is also true in the eyes of the 
law and is guaranteed by the involvement of lawyers sup-
porting their customers. In forensic matters, unlike account-
ing, only the objective is known at the onset of the mission, 
the means of achieving this goal is not normalized. 
Consequently, forensic matters are difficult to delegate, as 
all missions require in-depth knowledge of a technical 
field, practical experience and the ability to enter the judi-
cial arena. Communication skills could well be the key to 
FFEE, who must be able to skillfully handle requests for 
extensions in deadlines or for further financial support, 
when briefing judges on the opposite claims and in order 
to secure the payment of their own fees. Recourse to a 
court order, when a party is recalcitrant to transmit the 
information required, is not, however, a common practice. 
26% did say they resorted to a judge’s summons, while 
56% stated explicitly that they refused to do so. Finally, 
the specific technical, procedural and social skills, necessary 
to any forensic activity implies that FFEE are personally 
invested in the management of their missions: they are the 
master craftsmen appointed by judges. In other words, as 
their professional milieu is governed by the logic of the 
industrial convention and requirements, FFEE are rather 
engaged in a regime (in the sense developed by Thévenot 
2006) mixing the logic of the domestic convention domi-
nated by personal commitment or even tradition, and the 
logic of the network convention where specific, relational, 
and procedural more than economics skills are very im-
portant to obtain missions, be commissioned by judges 
and influence business and judicial ways used to solve 
conflicts. 
5. Who are experts? A milieu crossed by professional 
conventions 
To understand the conventional roles and the conventions 
structuring this milieu of experts itself, it is thus necessary 
to describe sociologically, even if shortly, these profession-
als. Despite variegated individual trajectories and differing 
stakes within the worlds of finance, accounting and man-
agement in economics, forensic experts form a relatively 
homogeneous group. They are generally accountants, who 
have had some form of legal training during their higher 
education: 71% of FFEE are marked as specializing in ac-
counting, and more than 1 in 5 of those having answered 
the questionnaire had some form of legal education. The 
strong dominance of accountants is accompanied by a 
certain uniformity in the individual profiles in terms of 
gender (91% are male), age (the average age is 57) and 
qualifications (most had postgraduate degrees, 4 or 5 years 
of higher education, and some even had a PhD). Finally, 
the forensic experts questioned work, for their vast majori-
ty, in an independent practice (86%), removed from all 
technical networks or associations (77%), employing fewer 
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than 10 people and with a small turnover (51%). The clien-
tele of these practices is qualified as nondescript (79%), 
generally consisting of small or very small businesses 
(64%), most of which were family run (61%). There are, 
however, some experts employed by bigger companies, 
financial institutions, or academic institutions. These are 
mainly the experts in finance, who operate in such envi-
ronments as senior executives or managers specialized in a 
banking or actuarial activity. Some experts also mentioned 
a clientele of very large groups and international compa-
nies (23%) and 17% of them reported belonging to a 
consortium of law firms (4%) or to a network (13%). 
The field of financial experts in common law countries 
differs from the one identified. Working naturally within a 
team and organizing their work according to their special-
ties and not as a secondary activity, forensic accountants 
are specialists within a professional group, rather than a 
caste within a professional body (Williams 2002). On the 
contrary, being a FFEE is, for the vast majority of all ex-
perts, a secondary activity, incidental to a main occupation. 
Only a few experts, often accredited by the French su-
preme court, are engaged in a greater number of missions 
and at a much larger scale than average. They have made 
themselves known by engaging in the transmission (train-
ing) and management (associations) of the know-how and 
social networks of their specialty and they have banked on 
accreditation by a public authority. These common traits to 
the actors of FFEE promote certain mimetic practices, im-
posed by the formal distance maintained between judges 
and experts, and by a small set of technical procedures 
shared by all forensic experts. Expert associations, bringing 
together more than two out of three FFEE, play a role in 
the matter, by filling in the uncertainty in which experts are 
left concerning the expectations of the law. Skills are 
shared and to some extent formalized, but most 
knowledge is transmitted during regularly held informal 
exchanges among peers, and sometimes in the presence of 
magistrates, by these associations. 
Finally, we see the necessity of conventions at three stages 
of this activity of FFEE. The legal framework, even if it for-
mally prescribes a very strict decisionnist model subordinat-
ing totally the experts to the judge, doesn’t allow for un-
derstanding the real activity of FFEE and actual, even un-
known, influence on the trial, its temporality, argumenta-
tive structuration or, sometimes, final decision. In other 
words, informal but structured conventions are used by the 
judges (in the formulation of their mission and what they 
are waiting) as the experts (in their actual activities and 
how they write their reports) to use the expertise at the 
benefit of the judicial truth and close  litigation. One can 
thus understand the conventional way adopted by the 
judge to choose whose expert he needs from the FFEE list, 
that is to say why the judges appoint embedded and well-
known professional in the milieu of forensic expertise. 
Through this social milieu and its very shortly description, 
we show finally how the conventions and the definition of 
what is legal compliance, at the intersection of business 
worlds and judicial institutions, are diffusing between FFEE 
and from them to the judges. In sum, forensics in econom-
ics bears and translates business conventions to the judges 
and help these conventions to be reinterpreting in terms of 
judicial decision. But they translate also reciprocally judicial 
conventions towards the world of business. 
6. Conventions at work: the forensic translator’s role 
from business conventions toward judicial decision… 
and reciprocally 
Indeed, the first movement described above is more or less 
evident, even if we show how and through what sort of 
mediation or mechanisms (like actual activity very different 
of the classical activity of the professional or a very singular 
social milieu), the business conventions are translated into 
the judicial world of trial and rules of law. But what we aim 
at showing to conclude is the reciprocal role developed by 
FFEE to translate the judicial conventions into the business 
world, during the “little trial” which is the expertise. 
Expertise is the time for dialogue between the expert, the 
parties and lawyers in the identification of appropriate 
financial evidence. But it is also a doubt period: sometimes 
the expert is faced with a dilemma when he “feels” tech-
nically the damage, but at the same time he thinks that the 
trial rules will not favor the "victim." For example (coming 
from personal survey of one of the authors, involved in the 
field), a publisher wrongfully terminated the contract bind-
ing him to an advertising agency. A lower court and then 
an appellate court conclude that such a termination was 
wrongful. A chartered accountant is given a mission to 
quantify the increase in customers contractually promised, 
and to estimate the loss suffered by the advertising agen-
cy. The expert calls numerous meetings notably because 
the conduct of the expertise is slowed by delays, due either 
to the agency (reluctant to disclose detailed forecasts and 
information concerning its sector of activity) or to the edi-
tor (who only provided figures, when summoned to do so, 
on the years under its new advertising agency). To over-
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come the blockage, the expert directed questions straight 
to the trade association, which circulates very general in-
formation. During the meetings, the expert presents tables 
with the information he has managed to gather, noting 
their deficiencies, and commenting at each time what he 
has had to deduce. During the final meeting, the expert 
explains that ultimately, the advertising agency had hardly 
uncovered any customers under the terms of the contract 
but that it had managed to very quickly compensate this 
loss in profits after the contract was broken. The discussion 
at this meeting is very heated, the advertising agency not-
ing that the publisher would not be punished for his 
wrongful termination on the grounds that the agency had 
managed to cope with the incident. After final submis-
sions, the Expert concludes that there was virtually no loss 
of benefit for the agency, given the way its affairs devel-
oped afterwards. But his report also assessed, in case the 
court was interested solely in the contractual relationship 
between the parties, which benefits the agency might have 
made had such benefits not escaped it. 
This example identifies several characteristics of financial 
expertise. Indeed one can see the expert asks the meth-
odological framework in which he asks the parties to prove 
their claim. He leads them by this methodological frame-
work to do calculations and document their claims against 
a judicial perspective that takes into account the economic 
knowledge of the company. The expert has also led to 
implement pro-active means for collecting information 
despite reluctance of the parties: there are characteristics 
of the managerial dimension of expertise and the fact that 
the expert works anymore by methodological means than 
by technical means. The debate at the last meeting also 
reveals the gap that can exist between an economical 
approach (market convention) and a judicial approach 
(civic convention), which is driven by the legal expert. In-
deed the expert assessed that the victim made losses be-
cause of the guilty according to financial criteria, he also 
quantified that the victim was able to achieve such profits 
despite the fault of the guilty. The expert, in charge of 
legal dimensions, links the losses and profits that the victim 
realized, with respect to a unique enterprise perspective. 
As a result the expert notes that the victim did not suffer 
injury. Nevertheless it is a form of windfall to the guilty 
because the victim was initially damaged and was able to 
compensate by reorganizing its firm. And we notice that 
the expert, perhaps uncomfortable with this situation, 
chooses to report the judge what would be the loss quan-
tum if the judge was sticking to the only relationship be-
tween the two parties, without taking into account the 
ability that the victim had to cope with the injury suffered. 
This case reveals thus how the forensic expert is not only 
about informing the judge with business conventions (fi-
nancial losses and profits); but also about guiding parties 
with judicial conventions or the civic convention (enterprise 
compensation). And this role of guidance is perhaps as 
important as the information for the judge: we have in-
deed to remember that judges are always free to reject the 
analyses and conclusions of the commissioned experts. 
Dumoulin (2007) has stressed the strategic use that judges 
make of forensic reports, which involves an ability to “pick 
and choose”, undermining the apparent influence of fo-
rensic experts. Moreover, by law, very few experts receive a 
copy of the ruling following their reports. 
Finally, as mentioned by FFEE in the questionnaires and 
interviews and confirmed by the judges, contacts between 
judges and experts during missions are rare. These are 
limited almost exclusively to procedural issues concerning 
the confidentiality of certain documents, the reluctance of 
a party to provide necessary information, a discussion on 
the scope of the mission, the deadline and budget of the 
expertise. All the technical issues are left to FFEE. Thus, 
though experts know that they are acting on behalf and 
under the supervision of judges, they also understand that 
this control does not concern their technical expertise, and 
that this will generally not be commented by the judge, 
whether the latter is satisfied or not. FFEE are thus quite 
free to fulfill their missions, as they feel fit. Is this not, 
however, how one distinguishes an expert from a very 
knowledgeable person: the fact that he or she is also ca-
pable of bringing interlocutors to an acceptable solution 
without needing to call on the commissioner? 
The story described above has also shown an expert active 
in his relationship intermediation, which suggests another 
argument to the judge giving him the relevant technical 
information. This pro-activity is also observed for market 
damages (an injury that judges seem insensitive and whose 
experts are trying to take over the calculations of the par-
ties) and audit methodology (when expert considers the 
damages evidence from the review of the organization and 
procedures of the company more than through the docu-
mentation of traces). 
We can thus conclude that the conventional dimensions of 
this activity and milieu of expertise are essential to under-
stand how business and justice meets in France. This role 
and this activity are – as other intermediaries – very essential 
to structure and evolve the conventions regulating business 
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relations, particularly when their conflict dimension deports 
the actors to the courts. With a radiating influence, beyond 
mere legal rules governing business relations and also affect 
the current uses, forensics in economics contribute clearly 
to the changing conventions on which economic actors 
can use to interact. 
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Endnotes 
1Following Durand-Barthez and Langlart (2012), the global 
turnover of FFEE exceeds 500 million $ per year. 
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To Move Institutional Analysis in the Right 
Direction
Olivier Favereau interviewed by Rainer 
Diaz-Bone 
Olivier Favereau is professor of economics at the Univer-
sity of Paris X-Nanterre. He is one of the founders of the 
French institutionalist approach of the “économie des con-
ventions” (economics of convention, in short EC). This 
pragmatic approach has developed in the last decades as a 
major part of the new French social sciences which have 
become also an important international approach in eco-
nomic sociology. Olivier Favereau has published many 
foundational publications. He co-edited “Conventions and 
structures in economic organization” (together with Em-
manuel Lazega, 2002), “L'activité marchande sans le mar-
ché?” (together with Armand Hatchuel and Franck Aggeri, 
2010) and he is the editor of “Les avocats, entre ordre 
professionnel et ordre marchand” (2010). In 2011 he pub-
lished the article “New institutional economics versus eco-
nomics of conventions” in the issue 13(1) of this newslet-
ter.1 favereau@u-paris10.fr  
You are one of the founders of the economics of conventions. 
Could you describe the way you got engaged into this socio-
economic movement? 
The apparent beginning was the working group during 18 
months, which lead us to the special issue of “Revue 
économique” (march 1989), called “the economics of 
conventions”. We were six, all trained in economics, but 
some leaning to sociology (François Eymard-Duvernay, 
Laurent Thévenot) or philosophy (Jean-Pierre Dupuy, and 
partly myself). I met my co-authors in 1984 either through 
a colloquium at INSEE, or through seminars at the Ecole 
polytechnique, both of which were attempts to combine 
rigorous economic thinking with other social sciences, in 
order to grasp the role of rules and institutions. During the 
years 1983/6, giving a copy of my own thesis (written in a 
rather lonely mood) was a very efficient means to make 
acquaintance with all these guys – and indeed to get new 
permanent friends! 
So your question becomes: how did my thesis (in macro-
economic theory, since the subject was “the level of un-
employment in a growing economy”) drive me towards 
what will be this part of the socio-economic movement 
called “the economics of conventions”? 
A first answer was simply my naive discontent (from a 
realist point of view) with the modeling of the labour mar-
ket, as a demand/supply apparatus. That simply does not 
function like that. We need organizations, institutions, 
rules, etc… 
The specific status of conventions needs a second answer. I 
have always been Keynesian – and convinced that some of 
the deepest Keynesian ideas have not yet been exploited: 
that was the case of the notion of “convention” to deal 
with radical uncertainty, forbidding numerical probabilities. 
But economists need formal models. Therefore, I was 
searching for non-probabilistic models of uncertainty. Then 
I began to study modal logics, especially the modern se-
mantics of possible worlds. And I discovered that one of its 
founders, the American analytical philosopher, David Lew-
is, has also written a small book called “Convention: a 
philosophical study”, in 1969, using game theory. So there 
seems to be a substantial connection between coordina-
tion, rules and the way human beings tackle uncertainty – 
and that clearly requires the joint work of several social 
sciences. 
EC has been established in France since the 1980ies. Today 
EC is the core of new French economic sociology, it’s a new 
socio-economic approach and an accepted – although heter-
odox – economists approach in France and it worked out a 
new pragmatic institutionalism. 
How did EC succeed in France – institutionally and cogni-
tively (in the way it has positioned itself against other ap-
proaches)? 
What you call the “success” of EC calls for a careful and 
rather prudent diagnosis. 
As for economics, EC was immediately (and rightly) per-
ceived as a forthright criticism of mainstream: first for its 
radical change of the most basic assumptions (interpretive, 
rather than only computational, rationality; coordination, 
by means of rules and norms, rather than through the sole 
Interview 
economic sociology_the european electronic newsletter  Volume 14, Number 1 (November 2012) 
41 
role of prices); second, by its non-imperialist connection 
with other social sciences. So the reaction of orthodox 
economists was not really friendly (mainstream is logically 
averse to pluralism): either scornful indifference, or re-
course to standard game theory to deal with conventions, 
along Lewis’ formal lines – but without his philosophical 
background, and indeed his own dissatisfaction with his 
1969 definition of convention (which lead him to a new 
one, integrating collective representations but unfortunate-
ly neglected by most commentators). 
As for sociology, the reaction was of course quite different. 
In a sense, EC could be considered as one new branch of 
sociology, therefore competing with the established ones 
(e.g. Bourdieu’s school). Inversely, within the emerging 
field of economic sociology, EC could not but appear as a 
partner, driving the cart in the same direction – if not with 
the ordinary wheels. The cooperation with economists was 
both a help (at last, there exist some economists ready to 
work on a par with sociologists) and an impediment (the 
entry into economic sociology was a rebuttal of standard 
economics, not a natural extension of sociological analysis). 
Finally, management researchers were unexpectedly the 
social scientists who greeted EC in the most straightfor-
ward way, simply as a new set of analytical tools, available 
for deconstructing coordination problems inside organiza-
tions and especially business firms, and enabling research-
ers, as well as practitioners, to have a new look at collec-
tive learning. 
Harrison White is one of the main representatives of new 
economic sociology. In 1981 he initiated this movement in 
the US with his article “Where do markets come from?” 
(White 1981). In 2000 there has been a meeting between 
representatives of EC and Harrison White in Paris. I guess 
the result is the publication of two books (“Conventions and 
structures in economic organization”, 2002 edited by Olivier 
Favereau and Emmanuel Lazega and “Markets from net-
works” in 2002 written by Harrison White). Could you ex-
plain how this meeting was organized and how do you eval-
uate this exchange between EC and Harrison White? Which 
outcomes are most important to you? 
I was lucky enough to read White’s 1981 paper before the 
end of my thesis, at a time when I had realistic models of 
financial markets (with Keynes) and labour markets (with 
Piore and the American institutionalists), but not of goods 
markets. So White’s model of competing business firms in 
a space of quality/prices ratios was a providential gift, 
stressing firms rather than markets. 
But the essential step of the encounter between White and 
EC came with the bold hypothesis of François Eymard-
Duvernay, translating Boltanski’s and Thévenot’s “cities” 
(Boltanski/Thévenot 2006) into “quality-conventions” (do-
mestic, merchant, industrial, etc.). When we had a talk on 
White’s model, he noticed that the types of quality associ-
ated with each of the areas of viable markets (as exempli-
fied by technical features of production and consumption) 
were coherent with his own typology of quality conven-
tions. Then with a third man, Olivier Biencourt, who made 
his thesis on the mathematics of White’s model, we closely 
scrutinized the connection and concluded that it was not an 
artefact (Favereau/Biencourt/Eymard-Duvernay 2002). In-
deed, our 2002 chapter gave us an opportunity to better 
understand both White’s sociology of markets and the logic 
of conventions, in a central part of capitalist economies. 
The last step of the encounter would be to make it com-
pletely clear why a theory of action as White’s structural 
one could be such an analytical partner with a style of 
economics, proceeding from methodological individualism 
(but in a Weberian understanding epistemology). My ten-
tative answer would be two-fold: first, a judgment on 
quality belongs to the class of normative judgments (that 
brings White near EC); second, the collective representa-
tion of a structure is an element of the structure (and that 
brings EC near White). 
In the 1980ies you introduced the concept of collective cog-
nitive dispositive as a collective representation in organiza-
tions and markets (Favereau 1986, 1989a, 1989b). This way 
EC opened towards cognitive sciences – years before it was 
done in mainstream economic institutionalism (as Douglas 
North did in the 1990ies). Could you sketch your motiva-
tion to criticize established notions of contract, rule or ra-
tionality by inventing and using this concept in institutional 
analysis? And – looking back – what are the main insights 
about cognition and collective cognitive dispositives, EC has 
gained since then? 
I introduced the notion of dispositif cognitif collectif to 
offer an alternative view of rules. For the orthodox eco-
nomic theory, rules are formalized either as pure con-
straints or as rational choices (contracts or quasi-contracts). 
In both cases, they are “in the head” of economic agents, 
they are part of the individual representation of the world 
(with a complete description of the possible future states 
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of nature). This is correlated with a severe misunderstand-
ing of the nature of rules. 
 “dispositive” or “device”, as Foucault has shown, means 
that rules are indeed a complex set of entities, a mix of rep-
resentations, statements, material objects, power relation-
ships, etc… 
 “collective” means that rules at least implicitly define (the 
satisfactory functioning of) a collectivity, to which the rule-
follower (or rule-breaker) belongs. Therefore, it is nonsense 
to speak about rules in a strictly individualistic and positivistic 
ontology (a rule is a normative entity). Here we are influ-
enced of course by Wittgenstein’s second philosophy. 
 “cognitive” means that rules are inversely a means to 
explore the type of collectivity to which we belong, its 
internal working, what can be achieved, individually and 
collectively, by participating to its functioning. “Cognition” 
here implies both reflexivity (we quite generally have a 
critical look at the relevance of the rules we are following) 
and, at a higher level, interpretation (application is neither 
a mechanical nor a computational operation). These two 
properties play an essential role in the success or failure of 
what management researchers, such as Argyris and Schön, 
call “organizational learning”. 
The three main insights to be drawn from that reading of 
rules are (i) the full acknowledgement of the facts that 
economic agents are consciously and actively interested in 
coordination, and that they do not act within a collective 
entity without building mental models of it; (ii) (as a conse-
quence of (i)) the epistemological necessity of admitting a 
third sphere of reality – intersubjective – beside the objec-
tive (the material world) and the subjective (preferences, 
expectations, etc..) ones, as many philosophers have ad-
mitted, from Karl Popper to Charles Taylor or Vincent 
Descombes; (iii) (as a consequence of (ii)) the analysis of 
the major economic crises (1929, 2008), as breakdowns of 
the prevailing regime of intersubjectivity and normativity 
(Boltanski/Chiapello 2007). 
Classical economic sociology integrated the analysis of law as 
important rules. In modern economic sociology this is rarely 
done. EC did and you edited a report about lawyers (Les 
avocats, entre ordre professionnel et ordre marchand, Paris 
2010). How does EC approach law and what are main con-
tributions of EC to the analysis of law?  
If EC, which stresses the coordinating power of rules, is a 
coherent programme of research, it must develop a specif-
ic approach to legal rules (more generally law), since they 
are such an important subset of the generic category 
“rule”. Obviously “law and economics” has been quite an 
active field of research for the last decades, and it is con-
venient to contrast the conventionalist approach to law 
with the mainstream one (with its two sides, one founded 
on optimizing formal microeconomics and the other using 
a discrete comparative methodology – the “transaction-
cost” paradigm). For a neutral observer, “law and econom-
ics” is at best an attempt to bring back questions of law 
within the standard economic model, using only rational 
agents (calculative rationality: e.g. cost-benefit analysis) 
and some sort of equilibrium (Nash or supply/demand). 
Those traditional tools may be useful to cast complemen-
tary light on some minor points implying law but how 
could they say anything relevant through assumptions on 
the function and the nature of law so much at variance 
with what philosophy of law has been exploring for years 
and years? 
EC calls for the opposite of the so-called “economic analy-
sis of law”: a law-like analysis of economics. In our eco-
nomic models, we must leave space for the functioning of 
legal rules, but in a way which is respectful of what is law 
for ... lawyers. For instance, law consists in deontic sen-
tences, which need to be interpreted. That means that 
homo economicus is not only a computer, he is speaking, 
and that changes a lot in the methodological equipment of 
the economist (much less for the sociologist). One obvious 
element is that “efficiency” is not the sole normative value, 
according to which the quality of law has to be appreciat-
ed. To say the least, “equity” or “justice” should also be 
mentioned. So law is essentially a means of solving con-
flicts of values (individual interest being one of these val-
ues), in a democratic society. In this particular sense, it’s 
indeed a technology of coordination. 
The specificity of that technology is that decisions to solve 
these kinds of conflicts have to be explicitly argued, along 
very determinate lines (our preferred references here 
would be Hart, Dworkin, and Latour). We do not follow 
the cynical sociology of law provided by Bourdieu: it’s not 
so easy to offer good justifications, but we are perfectly 
aware of the bad “conventions” of judgment that may 
influence the interpretations of the judges. I am currently 
working on the strange assumption behind “shareholder 
value”: the shareholders are supposed to be the owners of 
the corporation. For any serious lawyer, it’s plainly wrong 
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in corporate law. The shareholders own their shares, and 
that gives them some powers, but no “property rights” on 
the assets of the firm. So, you see, the fact that conven-
tions have some normative features does not make it im-
possible to have “bad” conventions. We owe this funda-
mental point to three young scholars, Philippe Batifoulier, 
Guillemette de Larquier, and Ariane Ghirardello. 
Our work on advocates is a corollary of our EC approach to 
law. Law should not be considered as a commodity like 
any other: with Lucien Karpik, we concluded it’s too im-
portant to be dealt with by markets and too complex to be 
dealt with by states. Its link with the common good (more 
than its nature of public good) explains the recourse in 
democratic societies to that very special historical construc-
tion: a professional order. 
You mentioned the levels of market and state. Early EC was 
criticized for being a micro level approach (not prepared to 
the analysis of economic and other social phenomena at the 
macro level) and also for ignoring power in the institutional 
analysis. How do you respond to these criticisms today? 
It is true that we initially privileged the micro-level, maybe 
because we thought that our colleagues and friends of 
“regulation theory” were already very active at the macro-
level but precisely our intuition was that they did not have 
the micro-economics for their macro-economics. The world 
recession opened by the subprime crisis has changed the 
landscape, because it makes us remind, on one hand, of 
the 1929 great depression, and, on the other hand, of the 
fact that, after all, the first conventionalist economist is ... 
Keynes. As André Orléan and I have noticed from the be-
ginning (and even before, through our theses), Keynes 
introduced a powerful concept of “convention” in the 
chapter 12 of his “General theory of employment, interest 
and money” and it gives nothing less than the key to the 
understanding of persistent mass unemployment, as in the 
years 1929/39! Mass unemployment is a macro-economic 
phenomenon, to be explained by a macro-economic dys-
functioning, condensed in the connection between the 
“real” sector of the economy (firms, jobs, output ...) and 
the financial sector. The latter is too greedy in its demand 
of return from the former in order to lend him money. The 
heart of the economic problem, for Keynes, is simply that 
we do not know what the future will be. Needless to say 
that it is in complete contradiction with the deepest tenets 
of mainstream economics. Therefore, there is no such 
thing as a “fundamental value” for financial assets and the 
interest rate is purely “conventional”. Sometimes very 
“bad” conventions are pervading the minds of economic 
agents. And nothing is more difficult to move than a con-
vention – partly because a majority is not aware of it (there 
is an inherent tendency to “naturalize” conventions). Here 
begins to appear the extreme importance of “ideas” and 
of the possibility of public debate and public criticism. The 
problem of social science and especially of economics is 
that economists are not made of a different stuff than the 
economic agents. So there may be also very bad conven-
tions among economists – Keynes, in order to qualify 
mainstream economics, coined the term “orthodox”, i.e. a 
religious term. He was right: all this is about defining what 
deserves to be considered as “reality” (God’s privilege!). I 
am close, here, to the last books of Luc Boltanski. 
Finally, for Keynes, a state of crisis is due to a pair of bad 
conventions: the first expressing an excessive power of the 
financial sector, the second expressing an excessive power 
of some normative ideas on how the economics should 
work (free markets, minimal State, predominance of finan-
cial evaluations, exaltation of selfish material rationality, 
depreciation of public interest, etc.). 
I have introduced the notion of “power”, which was the 
last part of your question, but through a special entrance. 
With Keynes, I stressed the role of a macro-system (finan-
cial sector, of which a major element is the financial mar-
ket) and, above all, the role of “ideas”, i.e. the cognitive 
framework, used by dominant groups to “institute” reality 
and to exploit it to their benefit, consciously or uncon-
sciously. That does not mean we ignore the more common 
sense of power, which is the right to give orders – indeed 
we are the only economists to adopt the judicial model of 
labour contract (an authority relationship), after the pio-
neer paper of Herbert Simon (1951). The message is rather 
that we should not forget the necessary extension of the 
notion of “power” to the “power of evaluation”, which is 
the real mark of the powerful people or groups. It is the 
present field of research of François Eymard-Duvernay. 
In 2006 François Eymard-Duvernay edited a two volume 
collection of papers which were elaborations of the big con-
ference titled „Conventions et institutions: approfondisse-
ments théoriques et contributions au débat politique“ (2003) 
about EC (Eymard-Duvernay 2006a, 2006b).2 Conferences 
and the following publications played an important role for 
the development of EC – since the first meeting “Les outils de 
gestion” in 1984 (Salais/Thévenot 1986). In 2009 there was 
another conference titled “Conventions: L’intersubjectif et le 
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normatif” which you directed.3 Could you summarize the 
most important topics and results from your point of view?  
These two meetings were of a very different character. The 
2003 conference, in the arch of La Défense (a paradigm of 
architectural modernity), was a very big international meet-
ing, which organized systematic discussions with well-
known representatives of the other trends of institutional-
ism and of economic sociology (Richard Swedberg and 
Harrison White, for instance). It was also planned to survey 
all the empirical applications of the conventionalist re-
search program. The 2009 meeting belongs to the mythic 
series of “Cerisy colloquia”. They take place in a medieval 
castle, in a remote part of Normandy and their logic is 
opposite to that of standard academic conferences. It 
gathers during five or six days not more than some dozens 
of researchers, invited by the organizers, because they 
deem that some field of inquiry or some question is on the 
point of being ripe, and that the interaction between the 
researchers may hopefully produce a positive collective 
result. An unusually long time is devoted to each talk – and 
to the discussion following it. 
After having said that, I am afraid you will probably be 
disappointed by my summary of the results of that “Cerisy 
colloquium” on “Conventions: Intersubjectivity and Nor-
mativity”. With this abstract title, we wanted to reaffirm 
conventions as a theoretical tool to study what the sub-
prime crisis has started to reveal in the capitalist world: a 
major dysfunctioning in the architecture of ideas and 
norms which support the working of the economy.  
Five of the six authors of the 1989 issue of Revue économique 
were present – but I prepared the program with young col-
leagues, and the first achievement of that week in Cerisy was 
that we all (old or young) discovered a new generation, fully 
involved in “conventionalist” researches, with a common 
spirit, highly critical of the mainstream economics, and not at 
all discouraged by its prevalence. 
The main result, I think, is the importance of that form of 
power which consists in fixing values and especially criteria 
of value. Many empirical studies (on labour, finance, mac-
roeconomic policy, health, law, corporate governance, 
culture, statistics, European economics, consumption, etc.) 
showed first that efficiency as much as equity require a 
plurality of criteria of evaluation, second that we have 
been submitted for the last thirty years to the dominance 
of only one, always quantitative and as often as possible 
financial: we have to subvert that regime of intersubjectivi-
ty and normativity sometimes called “neo-liberalism”. So 
the book in preparation – collecting the papers of the collo-
quium – will be entitled “Les conventions de l’économie en 
crise”, which has a double meaning: the crisis of the eco-
nomic conventions & the economic conventions during the 
crisis. 
For round about a quarter of a century EC has developed in 
France and today its founders are internationally recog-
nized. You mentioned the young colleagues and the “new 
generation”. From outside of France one can have the im-
pression of a “second generation” too – although it is not 
well recognized outside of France. What is your perspective 
of this second generation in regard of its research focus(es) 
and its contributions to the development of EC as a scientific 
movement? 
What is common to the first and the second generation is, 
I think, the shared principle that re-integrating the three 
dimensions, strictly differentiated by mainstream econom-
ics (coordination, rationality, values), is the good way to 
renew social science research, especially of course in eco-
nomics. Indeed it is now applied to new fields by our 
young colleagues: law & economics [F. Bessis, C. Bessy, C. 
Chaserant, S. Harnay], psychological economics [R. Kou-
makhov], corporate social responsibility [S. Montagné, N. 
Postel, A. Rebérioux, R. Sobel], typology of business mod-
els [O. Biencourt, G. de Larquier], ecology [G. Plumecoq], 
professional traditions and occupations [P. Batifoulier, F. 
Bessis, C. Bessy, B. Martin, D. Urrutiaguer], sociology of 
uses and consumption [E. Kessous, K. Mellet], role of the 
intermediaries on the labour or goods markets [G. de Lar-
quier, E. Marchal, D. Remillon, G. Rieucau], ubiquity and 
ambiguity of ethics in economic life [P. Batifoulier, A. 
Ghirardello, J. Latsis], urban economics [A. Lemarchand], 
political theory [A. Loute], European policies [G. Raveaud], 
health and family policies [P. Batifoulier, J. P. Domin, O. 
Thévenon, the pioneer role being played by M. Gadreau], 
etc. – just to give a short non-exhaustive sample of the 
“young generation”. 
However, in spite of its informativeness, my list has a major 
weakness. It does not give a clear idea of what drives my 
younger colleagues, through the empirical and theoretical 
works whose variety should be by now obvious. 
My impression is that the new generation is as much criti-
cal as ours but not in the same way. They are less interest-
ed by the theoretical fight against mainstream economics 
(partly because it may be more dispersed now, and there-
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fore more difficult to grasp) and more interested by the 
connection with the other trends of institutionalist social 
science. Quite an impressive sign of this move may have 
been given by the foundation of a new professional asso-
ciation: “Association Française d’Economie Politique”. 
Within two years it has gained more than 400 members. 
Its head is André Orléan (a conventionalist!), and its spirit is 
not so much heterodoxy as pluralism. I think most of my 
younger colleagues belong (like me) to that new associa-
tion. That apparent convergence does not mean the second 
generation has renounced its own specificity. Rather it im-
plies that we have to develop a positive alternative to main-
stream economics, of which EC will be a central piece, but 
with still too many black holes – the other trends of hetero-
dox economics have opened the way, and we have a lot to 
learn (if not to borrow) from their accomplishments. 
One element, already introduced in my review of Cerisy 
2009, gives the impetus: human beings live in a world 
where there is a plurality of values or better, of valuation 
powers. 
First, promoting and protecting this variety of criteria is a 
decisive step to criticize the capitalist system, at a time 
when we have lost faith in a possible global revolution. 
That may seem disappointing, but we must be aware of 
the implication: capitalism should be studied as such, at 
least in some part of the theory. A provocative shorthand 
for that program would be to elaborate a conventionalist 
re-reading of Marx and Polanyi. 
Second, it gives us a hint toward a new research program 
about the correspondence between micro and macro-
levels: rules (including conventions) are of course the es-
sential mediation, but not in the structuralist fashion. Here 
the specificity of EC is strongly posited. Human beings are 
not ants, they are somehow actors in the process of going 
from micro to macro, and vice-versa, because they are able 
to change rules, through collective action and individual 
deviations. Looking for the micro-economic foundations of 
macro-economics (or the opposite) should not any longer 
be separated from the question of social change and eco-
nomic dynamics. 
Third, stressing the variety of valuation practices explains 
why the new generation is so much interested in empirical 
work, which requires discovering new quantitative tools 
and qualitative protocols, coherent with  EC’s basic as-
sumptions on rationality, coordination and values. 
Fourth, that overall program (at least as I see it, after many 
discussions with P. Batifoulier, F. Bessis, N. Postel and many 
others) may seem unreasonably ambitious. But one thing 
was constantly stressed: the point is not to look for a radi-
cally new theory, but to move a theoretical language in the 
right direction. And changing a language is something 
which can only be done gradually, pragmatically, and col-
lectively. 
Endnotes 
1This interview continues the series of interviews in this newslet-
ter with founders of this French approach. See the interviews with 
Laurent Thévenot (2004) and Robert Salais (2008). 
2Conventions and institutions: Theoretical foundations and con-
tributions to the political debate“, 11th to 13th of December, 
Colloquium at the Institute International de la Défense at Paris. 
31st to 8th of September 2009, Colloquium at Cerisy. 
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Book Reviews
Book: André Orléan, 2011: L’Empire de la valeur. Refonder 
l’économie. Paris: Seuil. 
Reviewer: Heiner Ganßmann, professor emeritus, Freie 
Universität Berlin, heiner@ganssmann.de  
As the title of his book indicates, André Orléan (AO) wants 
to refound economic theory with the help of a new under-
standing of value. After centuries of debate about value, 
this is a big and optimistic project. Whereas many people, 
among them a sizeable share of economists, see the need 
for a radical revision of mainstream economic theory, one 
may be sceptical about the potential contribution of a 
theory of value to such a project. Nevertheless, rethinking 
value is what AO suggests, his main idea being that eco-
nomic values should be understood as social constructs, 
just like the moral, esthetique, religious, etc. values found 
in the domains of other social sciences. 
The book has three parts. In the first, "Critique de 
l´économie", AO discusses traditional value theories and 
relates their deficits to the notion of value as a "sub-
stance". By contrast, in his own approach, value is to be a 
relation and money is used to express value. In the second 
part, "L´institution de la valeur", AO elaborates his under-
standing of money: It answers the social need for a com-
mon medium of economic evaluation. In contrast to tradi-
tional attempts to explain money as the outcome of purely 
instrumental, rational actions, however, AO emphasizes 
that economic evaluation takes place not only as cool ra-
tional calculation, but is subject to emotional, normative, 
or traditional forces. Thus, economic value is closely related 
to other forms of value, moral, religious, cultural, esthetic, 
and so on. Given that economic value is only one kind in a 
whole universe of values, it is possible to place economic 
thought in a shared framework ("cadre unidisciplinaire") in 
which values are seen as social institutions by all social 
sciences. As institutions, values are rooted in something 
AO calls "l´affect commun", a feeling shared by all players 
in a given social field. It empowers them to act in unison, 
generating a specific extra force that is called "la puissance 
de multitude". In the third part, "La finance de marché", 
Orléan sketches an analysis of financial markets to demon-
strate the fruitfulness of his approach in contrast to the 
orthodox theory of "efficient" financial markets. Relying 
on Keynes, Orléan presents financial speculation as a pure 
bootstrap process, without foundations in any "objective 
value". By pursuing liquidity as such and relying on con-
ventions to cope with uncertainty, participants in financial 
markets come to act in unison. As their interactions drive 
positive feedback processes, they regularily produce bub-
bles and the ensuing crises. The book ends with a "Con-
clusion générale", a summary of the differences between 
traditional economic thought, with its restrictive reliance 
on individualism and utilitarian instrumental rationality, 
and AO´s own perspective, aiming for an understanding of 
economic value as a subspecies of the common values 
underlying all social life. Like any value, economic value is 
to be seen as the result of collective production, as an 
institution allowing us to live together. 
In what follows I will discuss two major issues that AO 
addresses with his book: the critique of value theory (1) 
and the concept of money and the way it is related to 
concepts of value in general (2). I will skip the discussion of 
financial markets and the drive for liquidity as their consti-
tutive characteristic. I think that AO´s analysis is seriously 
incomplete in its one-sided emphasis on positive feedback 
mechanisms feeding bubbles. Buyers and sellers of "finan-
cial products", lenders and borrowers, do have conflicting 
interests generating negative feedback, too, for example 
by hedging or speculating à la baisse. But AO´s analysis of 
financial markets is only loosely connected to his sugges-
tion to refound the theory of value, so whatever reserva-
tions one may have about the former does not necessarily 
affect the assessment of the latter. 
1) AO´s main argument against traditional value theories, 
be it the classical labor theory of value or marginal utility 
theory, is that they present value as a "substance" inher-
ent in economic objects (goods, commodities). While there 
are some practioners of value theory who use a vocabulary 
in which "value" is indeed described as some kind of sub-
stance1, I nonetheless think that this critique is largely 
beside the point. To explain prices has always been the 
reason for constructing a theory of economic value, from 
Adam Smith´s observation of the seeming paradox that 
high use value can be combined with low exchange value 
(and vice versa) to Debreu´s general equilibrium "theory of 
value" in which the "relative price" of any commodity 
depends on the state of the economic system as a whole. 
But neither labor nor utility are substances. Labor is a pro-
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cess, performed by individuals or collectives to produce 
useful things. To move beyond this description and main-
tain that products are "embodiments" of labor is a con-
ceptual construction intended to explain their prices. It may 
(but must not) lead to the misconception that such a non-
thing as "congealed labor" is the "substance" of value. 
Utility refers to a relation between individuals (or collec-
tives), and objects that have properties making them desir-
able for these individuals (or collectives). Outside such an 
agent-object relation, there is no such thing as utility. 
Again, there may have been economists who suggested 
that utility is inherent in objects as such and that their 
scarcity is a fact of nature, but that was and is simply a 
misunderstanding of utility. In short, I think it is wrong to 
discard traditional value theories, whether of the labor or 
the marginal utility kind, because they operated with no-
tions of value as "substance". Such misconceptions could 
be easily repaired in both cases without damaging the 
content of these theories as explanatory projects. 
A better reason for following AO in the renunciation of 
traditional value theories is that they are attempts to ex-
plain prices by abstracting from money. The primary ob-
servable facts to be explained by economic theories are 
prices, mappings of commodities as quantities of money, 
generated in operations of buying and selling. Traditional 
value theories approach this explanatory problem by put-
ting the empirical fact that money is always involved in 
such transactions in brackets, maintaining that the really 
important and interesting explananda are the underlying 
"real" exchange rates between commodities and com-
modities. In retrospect and with a little hermeneutic chari-
ty, one may understand why such abstraction from money 
seemed a good idea: To accept money use as a defining 
part of the starting problem of economic theory implies a 
level of reasoning of much higher complexity than explain-
ing pairwise barter transactions by relating them either to 
the agents´ productive efforts or their beliefs and desires. 
Money enters as a third entity into agent-goods-agent 
relations. With its own background in the legal and politi-
cal order, money is exposed to social forces that lie beyond 
the conceptual reach of the standard simplified construc-
tion of a system of pairwise barter constellations that is 
taken to determine "relative prices". Thus, while the theo-
retical strategy of abstracting from money seemed to be 
dictated by the need to "divide up the difficulties", such 
dividing has unfortunately meant that money never made 
its return into the main body of (micro)economic thought. 
Instead, the undue abstraction from money was justified 
with the afterthought that money is "neutral". As AO and 
many other heterodox economists rightly point out, this 
traditional procedure has had most damaging conse-
quences for both economic theory and economic policy. In 
sum, rather than rejecting traditional value theories for 
thinking in terms of "substances", the substantial reason 
for rejecting them should be that they have entangled 
many generations of economists in the impossible project 
of explaining money prices via abstraction from money. 
Such a rejection would have been well in line with the 
critique of general equilibrium theories by Benetti/Cartelier 
(1980), to which AO positively refers. Benetti/Cartelier 
show how value theories are based on a physical analogy 
("l´hypothèse de la nomenclature") and suggest as a rem-
edy: Start all economic reasoning by taking money as given 
and describe and analyze economic transactions by tracing 
the movements of money. At the start of his book, this 
appears to be the direction in which AO is moving, too. He 
describes value as purchasing power ("la valeur se trouve 
recherchée pour elle-meme, en tant que pouvoir d´achat 
universel" (p.12) and money as the institutional foundation 
of value and exchanges ("dans notre approche, la monnaie 
joue un role essentiel. Elle est l´institution qui fonde la 
valeur et les échanges."(p.13)). Thus, when one reads that 
there are no expressions of value except monetary ones ("Il 
n´y a d´expression de la valeur que monétaire" (p.29)), one 
is led to expect that, for AO, values simply are the same 
thing as money prices. If so, we might as well drop the 
term "value" from the economist´s vocabulary. It is redun-
dant. However, instead of getting rid of the whole rat´s 
nest of discourses on value, AO adds a new one. Why? 
2) In part 2, we find out. In its opening chapter on money, 
AO presents a thought experiment on "la genèse concep-
tuelle de la monnaie". He starts from an assumed setting 
in which agents are involved in commodity production and 
exchange, but have no money. (They are in a state which 
AO calls "la separation marchande".) This is a popular 
device in theories of money, found in approaches as diver-
gent as Marx and recent neoclassical search models. 
Agents cannot acquire the commodities others are bring-
ing to an assumed market by simply offering their own. 
Barter is impossible except in the rare instances where two 
agents find themselves in the condition of a "double coin-
cidence of wants". Trading on credit is impossible because 
there is no institution sanctioning the break of commit-
ments. How can they get out of this dilemma? (The di-
lemma is, of course, a fiction constructed by the theorist 
who assumes that agents act as private producers in a 
division of labor despite having no plausible hopes that 
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they can find others to exchange what they produce for 
what they need). Under the assumed pressure to invent 
some social tool that allows them to trade, agents begin to 
construct a monetary system by converging on the use of 
selected goods for indirect exchange. This is a Mengerian 
story according to which the most marketable goods are 
singled out for use as means of exchange by a group of 
market participants, with some having this good idea in 
the first place and the others imitating the successful. AO´s 
version of this story contains some additional ideas: He 
adds more details on the role of imitative behavior ("mi-
mesis", with convergence to the use of "biens liquids" as 
the result of – a largely unexplained – process of "mimetic 
polarization", cf. p.74f.); he introduces money not only as 
a means of exchange, but also as the unit of account (add-
ing the strange proposition that the only objective estimate 
of the value of money is the "one" of the unit of account 
which serves as the starting point of price formation, 
p.173); in Durkheim´s concept of social facts as external, 
supraindividual forces that exert moral authority so that 
individuals can become social beings (p. 203), AO finds for 
some backing in sociology for his aversion against meth-
odological individualism. To apply this Durkheimian propo-
sition beyond issues of shared morality to the theory of 
money, AO introduces a new name for the force responsi-
ble for the fusion of individuals into collectives:  "la puis-
sance de la multitude" (p.204). He then constructs an 
analogy between the installation of religious symbols and 
the ascription of monetary functions to some collectively 
selected good. In modern economies, this process results in 
the production of generally recognized "liquidity": "le bien 
élu" is what everybody wants and needs, because it is not 
only used for an unambiguous definition of the value of all 
other goods, but also needed by everybody for the access 
to commodities.2 
In this account of the "conceptual genesis of money", the 
origin and nature of the collective forces assumed to be 
driving the construction of a monetary system, namely, 
"l´affect commun" and "la puissance de la multitude", are 
mostly left in the dark. According to AO, these forces have 
power over individuals and allow them to become social 
beings. But is this Durkheimian account of social facts 
consistent with the simple and plausible assumption of – 
weak – methodological individualism that there is no loca-
tion for intentions, desires and beliefs other than the minds 
of individuals? Instead of somehow anchoring social facts 
in actions of individuals, AO suggests to move in the oppo-
site direction. Because money is in some mysterious way 
endowed with the extra-power of the "multitude", it turns 
into a supreme ruler and reins over its subjects in its "em-
pire". ("De meme que, dans l´ordre politique, le souverain 
est celui qui capte l´affect commun a son profit, la mon-
naie est souveraine dans l´ordre marchand par le fait 
qu´elle tient les sujets sous son empire, en tant qu´elle est 
l´autorité première par la grace de la puissance de la multi-
tude investie en elle" (p.212f.)). In other words, money not 
only acquires the properties of an agent, a being capable 
of intentional behavior, but it is deemed to be the supreme 
agent in all matters economic. Thus, we learn that the title 
of the book, "L´empire de la valeur", is not meant meta-
phorically, but literally: Value has an empire and money is 
the sovereign. The description AO gives of his project at 
the start of the book, namely, to understand the "value of 
commodities in its autonomy", "an autonomy it obtains 
due to money, so that we can see value in its majesty, in 
the fullness of its power" (12f.), is not just a flowery way 
of saying that everybody needs and wants money in a fully 
monetized economy. Nor is it a way of saying that such an 
economy pushes the people who make it work into a state 
of alienation that can be alleviated once they recognize 
that the forces ruling them are their own productions. 
Rather, AO tells us that people are governed by money and 
that economic theory should depict that state of affairs. 
This is not the place to discuss the merits or deficiencies of 
methodological individualism. However, in AO´s argument, 
it is rejected a bit too condescendingly and at the cost of 
endowing non-agents like money objects with the powers 
of agency in a rather mystifying way. It is one thing to 
maintain that the desire for money rules supreme in the 
commodity world (p.13), a proposition shared by observers 
of money use ever since Solon and Aristotle. But it is quite 
another thing to forget that a force that owes its power to 
the contributions of many individuals acting in unison (the 
"multitude") must at the same time be something that can 
be changed or abolished by those very individuals. AO´s 
contention to the contrary relies on examples from Durk-
heim, Mauss and others of the sources and overwhelming 
force of collective beliefs in so-called primitive societies. By 
contrast, modern societies have developed in processes of 
rationalization, secularization and individualization, as 
classical sociologists, including Durkheim, have taught us. 
These social developments imply that traditional group 
identities, whether based on common descend or shared 
beliefs, religious or political, have become precarious in 
contemporary societies. To put it differently: It is still hap-
pening every day that some speaker says "we", referring 
to collective intentions and a group proclaimed to act in 
unison. But in many social contexts everyday experiences 
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suggests that any individual included in such a "we" by 
the speaker may refuse to be part of the "we". This is not 
an abstract philosophical point irrelevant for the discussion 
of AO´s book on economic value and money. Rather, the 
irony is that the monetization of societies was one, if not 
the decisive factor in the destruction of the kind of self-
evident group identities that play such an important role in 
AO´s understanding of value and money. In other words, 
AO´s emphasis on what economic value has in common 
with other kinds of values, all being social constructs root-
ed in shared feelings, may be a good corrective for mis-
placed objectivism in mainstream economic thinking. But it 
is unlikely that money use is as firmly based in some un-
questioned common belief as are traditional religious atti-
tudes. People have had to learn that money use is plagued 
with uncertainties and generates its own crisis. If they live 
with it, nonetheless, it is not because they believe in some 
oikodicy, but rather for lack of a plausible alternative. 
Finally, a point on intellectual style: Given his emphasis on 
"collective production", the underlying "affect commun" 
and the "puissance de multitude", as an antidote to –
presumably mostly Anglosaxon – individualism and utilitar-
ianism, one is surprised that Orléan is not more explicit on 
how his own work relies on such collective production. As 
Bourdieu has noted, economics is such a wide field that 
you can find a heterodox critic for every orthodox conjec-
ture within the discipline itself. So it is unfortunate that AO 
does not introduce in more depth the broader intellectual 
background of his own work in France (for example, there 
is no reference to Bourdieu despite strong parallels in the 
rejection of mainstream economics) or the more recent 
English literature with similar concerns3. He thus comes 
across as the lonely prophet, vox clamans in deserto. The 
book is long enough as it is, of course, and one cannot 
really ask an author to make all his sources completely 
transparent. However, economic theory has always been 
an undertaking in which the mainstream is accompanied 
by a strong, if cacaphonic, chorus of heterodox econo-
mists. It would have been helpful for AO to clearly position 
himself in that field. Without that it is difficult to claim 
originality for yet another new alternative approach, and, 
alas, even more difficult to hope that it will have an impact 
on the mainstream to refound itself. 
In sum, AO´s book offers many interesting and unusual 
observations of the state of economic thought. The con
trasts to the traditional architecture of economic theory are 
sometimes striking, especially in the attempt to construct 
linkages to sociology and anthropology for a better under-
standing of economic institutions. But for the project of a 
refoundation of economic theory, AO offers only some first 
steps. Rejecting traditional microeconomics and its value 
theory by pointing out its various conceptual weaknesses, 
empirical irrelevance, non-realistic assumptions, etc., is not 
enough. A refoundation requires an alternative "vision", to 
use Schumpeter´s term, of the contemporary economy, a 
comprehensive and refinable picture of what it is all about. 
To present it as the "empire of value", with money as the 
"sovereign" in the ubiquitous chase for "liquidity" is an 
interesting conjecture, but we need to see more. 
Endnotes 
1Marx being a case in point – but one might argue that Marx, a 
well-versed Hegelian, used the term "substance" tongue in 
cheek. 
2AO´s conceptual apparatus is vague at this point: Is this a com-
modity theory of money? That would be implied in the Mengerian 
perspective, where the most marketable goods are used as as 
means of indirect exchange. Why else would AO call the object 
selected as the money object a good ("bien")? But then his ac-
count of money is seriously incomplete because we need to un-
derstand why modern forms of money are non-goods (in the 
standard sense of the term referring to means of consumption or 
production). 
3For example: "(I)n a social theory of value, money is the em-
bodiment of value; but precisely because it is socially instituted, its 
invariance cannot be predicated on any ´natural´ ground, and 
must continually be shored up and reconstituted by further social 
institutions, such as accountants, banks and governments." 
(Mirowski 1990: 712)  
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Book: Favereau, Olivier (ed.), 2010: Les avocats, entre 
ordre professionnel et ordre marchand. Lextenso éditions. 
Reviewer: Valérie Boussard, Université Paris Ouest, Nan-
terre La Défense, valerie.boussard@wanadoo.fr  
This book originates from a survey conducted by the 
French Bars Association (Conseil national des Barreaux) 
lead by Olivier Favereau. Heterodox economists (Franck 
Bessis, Camille Chasserant, Sophie Harnay, Christian Bessy) 
and economic sociologists (Lucien Karpik and Emmanuel 
Lazega) have combined their theoretical approach to mar-
kets in order to analyse a question raised by the bar associ-
ation: what would be the consequences of liberalizing the 
legal services market? This question was brought to atten-
tion after the European Commission published two reports 
that argued that the liberalization of the legal services 
market would be the best way to decrease prices and thus 
benefit the consumer. In these reports, liberalization 
sounds with the end of self-regulation by professional 
bodies. Self-regulated professions are seen as cartels op-
posed to fair and healthy free competition.  Such an as-
sumption overlaps the practical interests of the French 
bars, largely threatened by the liberalization, and the theo-
retical interests of academics who have been some of the 
strongest critics of orthodox economic theory. Investigating 
the case of the French professional regulation of legal 
services allows the academics to answer the European 
Commission reports and to deal with the more general use 
of orthodox economics for recommending public policies 
changes. The questions addressed by the book are three-
fold: How strong are the conclusions of the European 
Commission? What are the characteristics of the legal 
services market? Is market-based liberalization or profes-
sional-based regulation more suited for the characteristics 
of this specific market? 
The first question can be answered by an in-depth theoret-
ical discussion about the hypothesis and results of the 
European Commission reports. In the first chapter, Camille 
Chasserant and Sophie Harnay use both classical economic 
theory and more recent economic approaches to challenge 
the way the Commission reports leads to recommend 
liberalization. Their conclusion is a claim for an empirical 
study of the legal services market as the European Com-
mission Reports are lacking in this area. Subsequently, the 
following chapters deal with this empirical inquiry based 
on 27 interviews conducted with lawyers from a variety of 
law offices and law firms. This empirical data is analysed in 
order to highlight the characteristics of this market. In the 
second chapter, Emmanuel Lazega emphasizes the exist-
ence of collegiality and networking in the law profession.  
A typology of the lawyer’s professional practices is pre-
sented by Christian Bessy in the third chapter. In the fourth 
chapter, Franck Bessis sheds light on the way that the bar 
is a mean for lawyers to have reflexivity upon their profes-
sional practices, which cannot be achieved in a market-
driven organization. In the last chapter, Christian Bessy 
compares the legal services market with the legal labor 
markets and focuses on the professional education and 
training of lawyers. The empirical results presented in these 
4 chapters are used to test the consequences of the liberal-
ization versus the benefits of self-regulation. They conclude 
that professional regulation is superior to liberal deregula-
tion. 
The main arguments developed in the book are the follow-
ing. On a theoretical basis, the European Commission 
conclusions are false. The European Commission has mis-
used the classical economic theory. For example, following 
the most classical theory, the bar association cannot be 
compared to a cartel. Moreover, the European Commission 
has neglected recent economic results that serve as a bal-
ance against traditional assumptions. For instance, adver-
tising creates not only easier competition but entry barri-
ers. Finally, the European Commission focuses on price 
competition and thus ignores the competition on quality. If 
the effects of liberalization on prices are ambiguous, it is 
certain that the quality of the legal services would be low-
ered by liberalization.  
Empirical data shows how quality is achieved (or not). 
Quality is divided in two different and at times conflicting 
categories: micro-quality refers to the quality perceived by 
consumers; macro-quality refers to the participation of 
lawyers to law and justice as public goods. Subsequently, 
lawyers who satisfy most their clients are not necessary 
those who contribute the most to the rule of law. The 
typology of professional practices underlines different 
conventions of legal services quality (conventions de quali-
té). One of them, the market convention (convention 
marchande) is shared by law firms. It is close to the model 
of legal services advocated by the European Commission. 
But this convention tends to favor micro-quality against 
macro-quality. If it were to become the prominent conven-
tion, following the European Commission recommenda-
tions, it would affect the rule of law. For the authors, a 
balance between the different conventions of quality with-
in the legal services market is one condition for both micro 
and macro quality. A professional body, like the bar, allow-
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ing to deal with the micro/macro quality conflict is another 
condition. Yet, the authors do not conclude that current 
professional rules enforced by the bars are the more ap-
propriate. They could certainly be improved in order to 
promote more quality and better prices. They request an-
other empirical study dealing with this issue. 
The aim of this book is ambitious and salutary. It copes 
with current economic and political trends in the European 
community that tends to be unchallenged. Sociologists 
have already warned about the consequences of liberaliza-
tion on the quality of professional services like health or 
education (Allsop and Saks 2007, Kuhlman and Saks 
2008). E. Freidson, in a seminal book (Freidson 2001) typi-
fies two forms of work/services organization: Consumerism 
as an organization driven by market laws and consumer’s 
demands, professionalism as an organization lead by pro-
fessional rules and self-regulation. He points out that pro-
fessionalism is threatened by consumerism and should be 
protected. But his work has sometimes been criticized as a 
protection of professions and a return to functionalism, 
when sociologists believed in professions’ discourse about 
their ideal of serving clients and public good. Indeed, the 
confusion between professional discourse and professional 
reality has been noticed by other sociologists (Larson 1977, 
Johnson 1972), whose conclusion where close to those of 
the European Commission: professional discourse is a way 
to state and maintain a monopoly on economic activities. 
The only way to escape from this trap seems to pay atten-
tion to what professionals do and not only to what they 
say. This book follows this principle in going in depth with 
the quality of legal services, both by the critical review of 
the European Commission reports and by the fine 
knowledge about legal activities. The first chapter is cer-
tainly the most surprising and convincing as it attacks clas-
sical economic theory on its own terms. Other chapters are 
more predictable as they mix and renew previous well-
known studies of Lucien Karpik, E. Lazega, O. Favereau 
and C. Bessy. Though, they construct a well-grounded 
description of legal services and lawyers work, which can 
face and challenge the European Commission recommen-
dations. One can only regret the scope of the survey. Had 
there not been the previous inquiries of Karpik or Lazega in 
the legal field, the 27 interviews would be considered as 
too small of a sample for such ambitious assertions. 
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Book: Christian Bessy, Thierry Delpeuch and Jérôme Pélisse 
(eds.) 2011: Droit et régulations des activités économiques: 
perspectives sociologiques et institutionnalistes. Paris: 
LGDJ. 
Reviewer: Matthias Thiemann, Post-Doc at ESSEC Busi-
ness School Paris, mt2430@columbia.edu  
Institutional scholars have focused for a long time on inter-
relationships between law and regulations on the one 
hand and economic activity on the other, debunking the 
natural propensity of human beings to truck and barter 
(Adam Smith) as a naturalizing myth for a transaction 
mechanism that requires a rather sophisticated infrastruc-
ture (cf. Polanyi 1944, Commons 1924). They have shown 
that homo oeconomicus has to be facilitated by a legal 
infrastructure that fundamentally forms his specific ration-
ality. Despite this long-standing intellectual tradition, the 
current dominant approaches to the question of the mutu-
al relationship between law and economics, be it the law 
and economics approach or the new economic sociology 
(s. Kirat’s contribution in this volume for a detailed expla-
nation), treat law as exogenous to the economy and the 
rationality of market actors. 
In contrast, this collection of essays by French and Ameri-
can historians, economists, sociologists, legal and man-
agement scholars heavily builds on these institutional tradi-
tions, choosing as its particular point of entry the laws in 
action, rather than the law in the books. This leads them to 
consider the interplay of professional, organizational and 
ideational forces of the evolution of laws that structure 
economic activity pursuing venues laid by the theory of 
conventions, the economic neo-institutionalist perspective 
and the perspective of law and society. 
The very first contribution, Stanziani’s genealogical study 
of competition laws and the regulation of future markets 
in France and Europe points to the historically contingent 
struggle over the categorization of permitted vs. forbidden 
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economic activities. Rather than being explained by simple 
categories such as civil or common law, he points to the 
direct practical problems such a distinction imposes. Judges 
had to distinguish in judicial practice between speculative 
and just prices, requiring pragmatic decisions to a meta-
physical problem. Their failure to prevent a speculative 
crisis in 1885 led to the abolishment of anti-speculation 
laws in France, not the acceptance of speculation itself. 
Kirat’s chapter traces the historical reasons why the empiri-
cal analysis of the interplay of law and society, present in 
the work of Commons as well as Weber was lost upon 
American economists as well as most American sociolo-
gists, who by choosing neoclassical economics as their 
nemesis accepted the exogenous nature of law to econom-
ic activity. Didry and Vincensini, on the other hand detail 
how the institutional economist North grappled with the 
challenge posed to institutional economics by the Polany-
ian approach, revealing a sophisticated framework, which 
plays on the dichotomy of institutions that seek to struc-
ture economic activities vs. organizations as institutional 
entrepreneurs that learn to use the rules to their advantage 
and seek to transform the institutions, thereby providing a 
theoretical venue to think about the endogeneity of law. 
The volume then goes on to inquire how general, abstract 
laws and regulation can structure concrete economic activ-
ities and points to the work of adaptation, of translation 
and transformation of the intentions of these texts in eco-
nomic practice. The paradigmatic contribution of Lauren 
Edelman emphasizes the ambiguity and obscurity of legal 
texts and the engagement of the regulated organizations 
in defining what these laws exactly require of them. Given 
that laws are enacted in an asymmetric society (Coleman 
1982), in which organizational actors have much greater 
means to shape the interpretation of these rules, the law in 
practice might come to have opposed effects to what the 
lawmakers initially intends as organizations exploit the 
ambiguity and obscurity of the law to transform it in their 
favour. They do so in organizational fields, by employing 
professionals of compliance that shape the interpretation 
of these rules. Under situations of legal uncertainty, organ-
izational innovations are adapted which benefit managerial 
interests. The locus of this managerialization of the law 
resides in the daily application of the law and in the estab-
lishment of common interpretations about what a law is 
supposed to mean (Edelman). Bessy and Favereau’s contri-
bution on the changing labour market regulation in France 
complements these insights of Edelman’s approach well in 
that they problematise the lack of legal realism in the in-
fluential proposals of economists for labour market flexibil-
ization. The predominant individual approach in labour 
economics leads to the individualization of workers and 
the equalization of workers with enterprises as equal part-
ners in the exchange. It thereby ignores the advantages of 
expertise residing with employers which is used to disad-
vantage the marginal workers the reforms are supposed to 
help. 
The logical extension of the specific case of Edelman (Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act) is the focus on the professionals 
of compliance whose professional purpose is to facilitate 
the enactment of these rules in the organization and the 
question if they are bending the rules/ shaping their appli-
cation in favour of the corporation?  In the second part of 
the volume we find studies devoted to these actors and 
the conditions under which they operate that provide 
some evidence for this hypothesis. As the methodologically 
sophisticated study of the Parisian commercial court system 
(a public private partnership) shows, we find this potential 
for bias not only in the application, but also in the genera-
tion of law, hidden under organizational rules established 
to prevent it. With the help of a vacancy chain analysis, 
Lazega et al show that despite rules to the contrary, judges 
with a background in banking and finance occupy a cen-
tral place in the application of bankruptcy rules. 
Marc Lenglet’s contribution on deontologists in brokerage 
houses is fascinating, as it encapsulates many of the defin-
ing problems of compliance professionals, such as the 
translation of an abstract text into a concrete situation 
under time pressure and the interpretive questions related 
to it. His empirical examples speaks to the uncertainty in 
these moments, but remains silent on the question if the 
professional working conditions of deontologists in bro-
kerage firms leads to the continuous re-interpretation of 
rules in favour of the space of manoeuvre of the brokerage 
firm.  Stryker’s contribution on the role of industrial psy-
chologists in interpreting and shaping the application of 
the Civil Rights Act against discrimination is a counter-
example in which scientists as compliance professionals 
shaped the interpretation of the law in favour of black 
employees. The involvement of (social) scientists in the case 
of Stryker and of Montagne in changing the interpretation 
of laws forcefully demonstrates the ethical implications of 
social-scientific work. 
The third part is devoted to the historical genesis and prac-
tical generation of judicial tools that structure the interac-
tion between compliance professionals and the law. The 
study by Torny on circulaires epitomizes the emphasis of 
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the volume on the malleability of the law by focusing on a 
text which challenges as much current practices by profes-
sionals as it is challenged by them, allowing the state to 
start a debate about grievances, while exculpating it in the 
time in which a solution is sought. 
 Montagne’s study on the standard of prudence for US-
pension funds shows with impressive clarity the struggle of 
different interests at work in reshaping the meaning of 
prudence, from substantial to procedural to mere commu-
nicative duties. The creation of intersubjectively valid norms 
is characterized by the struggle between the interests of 
different actors. Of particular interest in this case is the fact 
that models of rational agents in financial economics were 
used by judges as reasons for reducing consumer protec-
tion. Marty’s contribution as well as the one of Chiapello 
and Medjad’s work show the acute awareness of the per-
formative aspects of accounting, which undergirds the 
political importance of accounting standard setting, as 
these rules shape rationalities of economic action. These 
approaches to accounting show a fruitful way of combin-
ing the institutional approach to law and economics with 
the approach of performativity as developed by Callon and 
Muniesa, because the political debates surrounding the 
generation and implementation of laws are analyzed ex-
plicitly. 
Criticism: To edit a volume of this size with this number of 
accomplished researchers is a major achievement. Howev-
er, while the empirical objects of study are largely similar, 
the researchers aren’t all pursuing the same research pro-
gramme or even asking the same questions. For example, 
the convincing portrayal of Western banks in Bulgaria as 
forces of a re-judicialization of the credit business in the 
contribution by Delpeuch and Vassileva raises at the same 
time the unanswered question in how far these banks 
were using their power to institute a legal framework in 
their favour regarding consumer protection and usury 
laws. The introductory chapter is quite complex and diffi-
cult to read, and might have been more appropriate as a 
final chapter, especially given that the introductions to the 
different parts of the volume are already very helpful in 
guiding the reader. Given the often implicit dialogue with 
performativity studies that is pervading several chapters 
and the final chapter’s long debate of performativity stud-
ies, one is led to ask oneself why there is no direct contri-
bution of this school of thought in the book? It seems 
more relevant to this volume than the contribution of 
Suchman, for example. Lastly, the role of state regulators 
in this volume remains underdeveloped, providing the 
picture of the state as a site to be conquered rather than 
an actor to be reckoned with. 
Conclusion: This volume forcefully demonstrates the fertili-
ty of the hypothesis of the dynamic endogenization of laws 
by the economic actors it seeks to guide and thereby pro-
vides a critical approach to the formulation, interpretation 
and implementation of laws in the economic realm. Its 
emphasis on intersubjectively shared norms as the out-
come of the struggle of antagonistic logics is most appro-
priate and its focus on the role of compliance professionals 
in this process opens up important research sites to under-
stand these dynamics, linking the sociology of professions 
and economic sociology in an interesting way. It thereby 
offers a more accurate understanding of economic activi-
ties, which often are driven by the creative compliance to 
new rules. Last but not least, it might offer economic soci-
ologists a path to produce more policy-relevant work, a 
characteristic which has been found wanting (Lounsboury 
and Hirsch 2011). 
Disclaimer: To summarize a volume of 17 chapters in a few 
pages is a thankless task, especially when dealing with a 
particularly rich collection of essays in terms of empirical 
material as well as theoretical insights. I ask the authors as 
well as the reader to appreciate the need for abbreviation.  
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The aim of this dissertation is to shed light on the behav-
iour of banks in order to provide useful advice on how to 
regulate and supervise them with respect to their size, 
legal status, disciplinary mechanisms and their organisa-
tional specifics. To make the study feasible, the author 
focuses on cooperative banks, namely those operating in 
Italy, and compare them with standard commercial banks. 
On average, cooperative banks are small institutions with a 
distinctive management and governance system. These 
banks are characterized by conservative profit allocation 
policies and safe business strategies. The European Associ-
ation of Cooperative Banks (EACB) defines them as a ‘bea-
con of stability in a rapidly changing environment’. Accord-
ing to Angelini and Cetorelli (2003), such banks are some-
what similar to credit unions in the US: they operate in 
‘market niches’ and thus have extra market power. 
Should all banks be regulated and supervised equally? A 
number of scholars argue in favour of an international 
financial supervision and regulation, and for a specific, 
universal regulation of banks (Eatwell and Taylor, 2000; 
Alexander et al., 2005). However, one may ask whether 
such a regulation is adequate for small, local banks that 
operate on a local or, at best, at a national level. Indeed, 
distinguished scholars, economists and policy-makers such 
as Dani Rodrik (2009) recently argued that a global finan-
cial regulation is not feasible; instead, nations and national 
authorities should be in charge of implementing regula-
tions on the basis of some ‘sensible rules’. 
This dissertation draws on Dewatripont and Tirole’s (2003) 
argument that an adequate regulation of the banking 
sector must start from a definition of what banking is and 
why is regulation needed in that sector. The project com-
prises three articles on the topic of corporate governance 
in Italian cooperative banks and their regulation. The arti-
cles are listed in the following order: 
 The article Competitive Advantages and Challenges in 
the Italian Cooperative Credit System argues that in Italy, 
cooperative banks play a major role in the financial system 
and the economy. They provide credit to individuals and 
households, as well as capital to small local firms operating 
in sectors such as agriculture. These banks often relate to a 
cooperative credit network that grants them an adequate 
level of competitiveness in the Italian market. By effectively 
implementing democratic principles of governance and by 
focusing on relationship banking, they foster responsible 
behaviour, which has proved to be crucial in times of crisis. 
The paper covers both the competitive advantages (result-
ing, for instance, from a prudential and safe business 
model, and from a business philosophy based on social 
relations and trust) and the challenges faced by coopera-
tive credit banks in Italy. Finally, it suggests that a better 
understanding of their specifics would help to highlight the 
contribution of a sound cooperation to economics. 
 The second article, titled Profitability of Italian Coopera-
tive and Commercial Banks during the Financial Crisis eval-
uates the performance of Italian banks with respect to 
their business models and the typology of their activities in 
the 2006-2008 period, a period of major financial distress. 
A model is provided on the basis of a number of financial 
and economic variables to account for return on equity, 
asset quality, and typology of activity and liquidity. Results 
suggest that Italian cooperative banks – both popular 
banks and cooperative credit banks – have been able to 
accumulate capital and provide credit to customers despite 
the ongoing crisis. Conclusions in the paper suggest that 
cooperative banking in Italy should be encouraged due to 
its positive contribution to economic development and 
financial stability (at least during the first wave of the cri-
sis). It is nonetheless argued that cooperative banks should 
be supervised as effectively as commercial banks since they 
are far from being immune to failure. 
 Finally, the last paper titled Governance specifics in co-
operative banks. Or, why do managers in Italian coopera-
tive banks ‘survive’ longer investigates management turno-
ver in Italian banks by means of a survival analysis method. 
The study tests whether management turnover differs 
according to different types of banking groups – for in-
stance cooperative and commercial banks, and whether 
top managers in cooperative banks are more likely to stay 
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on longer in their managerial position. Additionally, results 
confirm that the juridical form of banks significantly relates 
to management turnover: cooperative banks show a supe-
rior survival probability in comparison to other banks. On 
the other hand, results show that in Italian banks, man-
agement turnover is less frequent for managers with a 
high level of education and with honorific titles. Top man-
agers in cooperative banks tend to survive longer than top 
managers in commercial banks also when bank perfor-
mance is below average. 
What the three papers manage to show quite clearly is 
that different banks and banking groups behave differently 
and are governed differently. They pursue different goals 
(in Italian cooperative banks profit-making is essentially 
matched by social goals), different business strategies, they 
operate in different market segments (for example, in 
contrast to commercial banks, cooperative banks do not 
engage so much in the interbanking market); and they 
have different risk-taking attitudes and perceive risks dif-
ferently. Here it shall suffice to say that the failure of single 
cooperative banks – particularly those that operate locally – 
can hardly be seen as a source of systemic failure, as in the 
case of commercial banks. It does not come as a surprise 
then that cooperative banks are supervised somewhat 
differently to commercial banks. Finally, different banking 
groups have reacted to the crisis differently: cooperative 
banks have been less exposed to the first wave of the crisis 
which developed internationally. Instead, they have suf-
fered during the second (ongoing) wave of the crisis when 
problems emerged at the level of local economies.  
A key concept that thus clearly emerges from the three 
papers is that of diversity in banking. It is a concept that 
the reader should bear in mind when reading the disserta-
tion as it may help him or her to better follow the papers. 
It is important to recognize the organizational and institu-
tional differences of different types of banks. In the past 
decades, too little attention has been paid to institutional 
diversity in banking at the level of policy-making and in 
scholarly research: contributions from both economic soci-
ologists and institutional economists would be particularly 
valuable and useful to better address these issues and shed 
new light on them. Unless such differences are adequately 
accounted for, policy-makers and financial supervisors will 
not be able to provide the kind of regulation in which the 
“rules” will allow different banks to play the “game” fair-
ly. Some participants might be disadvantaged or even 
excluded from fair competition, which would go against 
the principles of a sound market economy.  
In conclusion, the present dissertation supports the idea 
that diversity should be given adequate attention in bank-
ing and economics as this would prevent the kind of think-
ing in mainstream economics which was one of the main 
reasons for the 2007-2008 financial crisis. This would in 
turn help to distinguish between the quantity and the 
quality of rules, and help to recognize that “better” rules 
rather than simply “new” ones are currently needed in the 
regulation of financial markets and banks. The research 
here is limited to the Italian market. It is nonetheless the 
belief of the author that its arguments might be equally 
valid for other countries in the European Union, something 
that he wishes to test in his future research. 
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